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WILLPOWER TAXES
Lee Anne Fennell*
Self-control and related concepts appear regularly in tax discussions,
but often they are invoked hazily or blurred together with other aspects of
choice over time. Despite the evident relevance of willpower to consumption
patterns, wealth accumulation, and, ultimately, well-being, there is no
consensus about whether and how heterogeneity along this dimension
should factor into tax policy. There is support in the tax literature for such
divergent responses as funneling more resources to low-willpower people,
penalizing them for their lapses, and limiting their choices. Whether we
should follow one of these approaches, or some other approach entirely,
requires a careful analysis of willpower’s workings and its connections to
well-being. To begin such an analysis, I focus on three categories of costs
associated with willpower problems: the failure costs of suboptimal
choices, exercise costs stemming from the willpower exertion itself, and
erosion costs that relate to changes over time in willpower levels as a result
of patterns of exertions and outcomes. With this framework in mind, I
consider the effects of existing and proposed tax policy measures on people
with different self-control levels. I then consider some alternatives that
would address heterogeneity in willpower through a menu of regulatory
bundles designed to induce self-sorting.
INTRODUCTION
Willpower1 matters to well-being. It also implicates activities—saving,
spending, and earning—that fall squarely within the ambit of public
finance. Yet there is no consensus about how this feature of human behavior
*
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Anne Alstott, Ilan Benshalom,
Victor Fleischer, William Gentry, Michael Graetz, Leandra Lederman, Richard McAdams, Jonathan Nash, Alex
Raskolnikov, David Schizer, Warren Schwartz, Lawrence Zelenak, and participants in Columbia Law School's
Tax Policy Colloquium, the University of Chicago Law School’s Works in Progress series, the 2009 American
Law and Economics Association meeting, and the 2010 Roundtable on Tax and Distributive Justice at the
University of Colorado School of Law for very helpful comments and questions. I thank the Stuart C. and JoAnn
Nathan Faculty Fund for financial support. Prisca Kim, Catherine Kiwala, and Eric Singer provided excellent
research assistance. Portions of the analysis developed in this piece appeared in abbreviated form in Lee Anne
Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 91 (2009).
1
I use the terms “willpower” and “self-control” interchangably here to refer (roughly) to one’s personal
efficacy in pursuing the consumption plan one deems best. Part I.A.1, infra, provides a more complete working
definition.
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should factor into tax policy. Would an ideal “willpower tax” place a
heavier burden on those who exhibit a greater ability to optimally spread
their consumption over time (just as income taxes place a heavier burden on
those who evidence a greater ability to earn money), or would it operate like
a sin tax on willpower lapses, placing additional burdens on those who
exhibit low self-control? There is support in the tax and public finance
literature for each of these approaches, as well as for the simpler expedient
of directly limiting choices. In the background is a growing body of social
science research suggesting that willpower exertions are literally taxing; at
least in the short run, these exertions draw down a limited stock of cognitive
resources.2 Self-control issues present political complexities as well; more
than most behavioral phenomena, willpower lapses touch nerves and evoke
sharply inconsistent normative reactions.
The unresolved question of what to do about willpower surfaces
regularly in key tax policy debates. Assumptions about self-control carry
implications for the choice between consumption and income taxes,3 bear
directly on whether tax liability should be assessed on an annual or lifetime
basis,4 and feature prominently in analyses of public finance mechanisms
that carry out intrapersonal transfers through the life cycle.5 Further,
willpower considerations inform philosophical questions relevant to tax
policy, such as whether we should evaluate well-being in terms of entire
lives or shorter temporal “slices,”6 or from an ex ante or ex post
perspective.7 Many other high-profile legal and policy issues raise self2
For a recent review of this literature, see Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of
Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis, 136 PSYCH. BULL. 495 (2010); see also infra Part I.C.2.
3
In this connection, see the following recent colloquy: Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1444-48 (2006)
[hereinafter Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority]; Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus,
60 STAN. L. REV. 745, 784-85 (2007); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, Reply, Consumption Taxation Is
Still Superior to Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 789, 800-01 (2007) [hereinafter Bankman & Weisbach,
Reply].
4
See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 774-76; Jeffrey B. Liebman, Should Taxes Be Based on Lifetime
Income? Vickrey Taxation Revisited (December 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/jeffreyliebman/vickreydec2003.pdf) 32-37.
5
Social Security is an obvious focus. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Optimal Level of Social Security
Benefits, 100 Q. J. ECON. 303 (1985); Louis Kaplow, Myopia and the Effects of Social Security and Capital
Taxation on Labor Supply, NBER Working Paper No. 12452 (2006); Cağri S. Kumru & Athanasios C.
Thanopoulos, Social Security and Self Control Preferences, 32 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 757 (2008). In
addition, progressive taxation produces intrapersonal as well as interpersonal redistribution—an effect that can be
heightened or dampened through measures like age-based taxation. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Imperfect
Capital Markets, Intertemporal Redistribution, and Progressive Taxation, in REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC
CHOICE 229, 246-48, 250 (Harold Hochman ed., 1974); Lee Anne Fennell and Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time,
59 TAX L. REV. 1, 45-51 (2005).
6
See Matthew D. Adler, Well-Being, Inequality, and Time: The Time-Slice Problem and Its Policy
Implications, U Penn. Law School Paper No. 169 (2007), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/169.
7
See Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal
Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (2006) (discussing "the 'ex ante/ex post' problem"). Although Adler and
Sanchirico focus primarily on the wedge that uncertainty drives between the two points of evaluation, ex ante/ex
post evaluative questions are raised in the tax realm by different consumption outcomes, including those generated
by savings choices. See Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax, 89 YALE L.J.
1081, 1097-1101 (1980); see also Mark Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649, 654-56
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control questions that are (or might be) addressed through tax and public
finance instruments—including choices about welfare benefits,8 consumer
credit regulation,9 and the treatment of “vice” products like cigarettes10 or
fatty foods.11
The significance of the topic has not gone unnoticed. In recent years,
the tax and public finance literature has increasingly taken account of
complexities of human behavior, including time-inconsistent preferences
and self-control issues.12 A large body of work has empirically examined
and mathematically modeled many different aspects of the willpower
question.13 But the legal literature lacks a systematic and accessible
framework for putting these pieces together to inform tax policy. This paper
makes a start at constructing such a framework, placing particular emphasis
on the issue of willpower heterogeneity.
The analysis here proceeds in four steps. Part I examines why and how
willpower matters to well-being. This inquiry requires delving into how
self-control works, how it is developed, how it is deployed, and the extent
to which it can become depleted. It is also necessary to distinguish
willpower from a welter of distinct but often conflated matters such as pure
time preferences, risk preferences, and subjectively preferred but societally
disfavored consumption plans. From this discussion, I distill three
categories of costs associated with willpower problems: failure costs
associated with suboptimal choices, exercise costs stemming from the
willpower exertion itself, and erosion costs that relate to changes over time
in willpower levels as a result of patterns of exertions and outcomes.14
With this framework in mind, I consider how tax policy might best
respond to self-control problems, given heterogeneity in self-control levels.
Part II abstracts from real-world difficulties in observing willpower levels
(1983); Bankman and Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1441-44.
8
Consider, for example, the practice of offering applicants a lump-sum “diversion” payment in exchange for
forgoing future monthly Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) payments. See, e.g., GRETCHEN
ROWE & MARY MURPHY, WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2006 (2008),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411686_welfare_databook06.pdf, at 32-35, tbl. A.1.A (detailing
state diversion programs, some of which preclude future TANF receipt for two, three, or even four times as long
as the period necessary to amortize the lump sum payment).
9
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 1373 (2004).
10
See, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of
Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. (papers and proceedings) 186 (2003); Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla,
Time-Inconsistency and Welfare, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10345 (2004).
11
See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the "Fat Tax": The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78
S. CAL. L. REV. 1221 (2005); Sarah McBride, Exiling the Happy Meal, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2008, A14 (listing
measures and proposals to regulate fatty foods in a number of cities). Sweetened beverages have been a recent
target of some (as yet unsuccessful) tax efforts. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of State Soda Tax Plan
Reflects Power of an Antitax Message, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2010 (discussing a failed attempt at soda taxation in
New York and similar efforts elsewhere).
12
See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY AND JOEL SLEMROD, EDS., BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE (2006); see
also sources cited infra Parts II and III (connecting self-control issues to tax policy questions).
13
This literature is discussed and cited extensively infra. For a recent overview, see Lee Anne Fennell,
Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 91 (2009).
14
See infra Part I.C.
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to consider three basic approaches: compensatory payments, penalties for
lapses, and restrictions on choice. In Part III, I examine how existing and
proposed tax policy choices might (intentionally or not) generate or
eliminate advantages or disadvantages for people with different willpower
levels. Finally, in Part IV, I consider mechanisms that could reduce the
informational burdens associated with willpower interventions. Specifically,
I investigate whether it might be possible to induce taxpayers to self-sort
into high-willpower and low-willpower groupings by offering a choice
between two regulatory bundles that would be differentially attractive to the
two groups.
Before beginning, a caveat is in order. My project here is a limited one.
Willpower is not the only—or even necessarily the most important—
cognitive feature that is relevant to tax policy. Willpower heterogeneity
interacts with many other forms of heterogeneity (in ability, earning
patterns, time preferences, consumption pattern preferences, and so on) in
tremendously complex ways. Self-control problems also interact with—and
potentially counteract—a variety of other cognitive biases and errors.15 I do
not attempt to model the interaction of these factors or to say anything
prescriptive about what would be the best approach for tax policy, all things
considered. Instead, I focus on just one piece of the puzzle and examine
how and why it matters. Even within that narrow compass, my efforts here
are necessarily tentative; much depends on empirical questions that have
not yet received definitive answers. Nonetheless, laying out the relevant
considerations and specifying their implications clears a path for future
work.
I. WILLPOWER AND WHY IT MATTERS
A common lament is that people behave myopically, saving too little,
consuming too hastily, indulging in bad habits, and, in general, too heavily
discounting the impact of their present choices on their future selves.16 But
this pattern is hardly universal. Indeed, some people have the opposite
problem, hyperopia—an overweighting of the future relative to the present
that manifests itself in behaviors like extreme miserliness or workaholism.17
15
See, e.g., Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerations in Correcting Cognitive Biases, 71 S. ECON. J.
12 (2004).
16
See, e.g., David Brooks, The Great Seduction, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008 (contending that it is now
"considered normal to play the debt game and imagine that decisions made today will have no consequences for
the future."). For an overview of myopia and discounting, see JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 47080 (3d ed. 2000).
17
See, e.g., Ran Kivetz & Itamar Simonson, Self-Control for the Righteous: Toward a Theory of Precommitment to Indulgence, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 199 (2002); Daniel Hamermesh & Joel Slemrod, The
Economics of Workaholism: We Should Not Have Worked on This Paper, 8 B.E. J. OF ECON. ANALYSIS & POL.,
Article 3 (2008). http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/iss1/art3; George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the
Valuation of Delayed Consumption, 97 ECON. J. 666 (1987); Lee Anne Fennell, Hyperopia in Public Finance, in
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While these patterns could be produced by stable preferences (as for always
consuming earlier rather than later, or vice versa), people often make
choices about consumption that are at odds with what they claim to want for
themselves.18 We know that people grapple with intertemporal dilemmas,
and that they do so with varying degrees of self-awareness and success.19
Because self-control varies among individuals and can have marked effects
on well-being over the life cycle, its relevance for public policy in general
and tax policy in particular is intuitive. But to pin down precisely how and
why it matters, we first need a working definition of willpower itself.
A. Defining Willpower
Intertemporal decisionmaking is a vast and complex field of study,20 and
one in which terms have not always been used consistently.21 Although
definitions vary, I will use the term “willpower” in this paper to refer to
one's personal efficacy in carrying out the consumption path that one (from
a cool, reflective, composite, or long-run perspective)22 deems to be the best
of those that lie open. In other words, willpower operates within the gap
between the consumption that one is tempted or habituated to undertake and
some self-identified and otherwise attainable ideal.23 Self-control problems
must be carefully distinguished both from cognitive errors that keep people
from recognizing what is best for them to do and from preferences,
including time-related preferences, that cause behavior to diverge from what
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 141 (Edward J. McCaffery and Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006).
18
See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim, Do Households Appreciate Their Financial Vulnerabilities? An Analysis
of Actions, Perceptions, and Public Policy, in TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 3 (1995) (investigating
disparities between "target" and "actual" savings rates based on survey data and finding that "[t]he median baby
boomer believes that it would be appropriate to triple his or her rate of saving for retirement"); Scott I. Rick et al.,
Tightwads and Spendthrifts, 34 J. CONSUMER RES. 767, 770 (2007) (presenting survey results in which many
people self-report problems with underspending or overspending); George-Marios Angeletos, et al., The
Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evidence, in TIME AND DECISION 517,
517-18 (George Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003) (reviewing evidence on perceived undersaving).
19
See, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Self-Awareness and Self-Control, in TIME AND DECISION
217 (George Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003); text accompanying note 36, infra.
20
For a concise intellectual history of intertemporal choice, see George Loewenstein, The Fall and Rise of
Psychological Explanations in the Economics of Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIME (George
Loewenstein & Jon Elster, eds., 1992). Work in this field has proliferated in recent years, generating numerous
competing models for time-related choice. See, e.g., Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time
Preference: A Critical Review in TIME AND DECISION 13 (George Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003).
21
See, e.g., Frederick et al., supra note 20, at 61-62 & fig. 1.4; id. at 73 n. 42 (listing 19 different terms used
in discussing choice over time).
22
A two-self model is frequently used to capture the conflict that calls for the exercise of willpower. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
23
This notion of a "gap" between preferred and actual consumption appears regularly in the literature. See,
e.g., David J. Laibson, Hyperbolic Discount Functions, Undersaving, and Savings Policy, NBER Working Paper
No. 5635 (June 1996), at 2 (identifying a "sophisticated saver" with a known self-control problem with the
following statement: "Regardless of which tax regime the government adopts, I expect to experience a large gap
between my actual savings level and my normative savings level."); John Ameriks, et al., Measuring Self-Control
Problems, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 966 (2007) (studying an "expected-ideal (EI) gap" in people's consumption
allocation choices).
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observers might think is best. A few clarifications will help flesh out these
distinctions.
First, willpower relates to individuals' subjective optimization efforts,
and thus does not depend on societal judgments about the desirability of any
particular consumption plan.24 As a corollary of this point, low willpower
can produce not only behavior we might identify as myopic (such as
overspending), but also behavior that is hyperopic (such as oversaving).25
Defining willpower in terms of subjective consumption goals rather than by
reference to an objective benchmark enables us to draw a distinction
between lapses of willpower and mere preferences. A unrepentant
spendthrift (or overeater or drug user26) may exhibit consumption patterns
that others would view as improvident, but unless she herself perceives that
another consumption path would be better, her behavior cannot properly be
viewed as a failure of willpower.27
Second, willpower is used here in a manner synonymous with selfcontrol;28 it therefore implies at least the intermittent existence of an
internal would-be "controller" who purports to have superior insight into the
best available consumption plan for the individual.29 Time-inconsistent
24
To be sure, an observer might summarily attribute a lack of willpower to any individual who fails to
achieve the consumption patterns that the observer herself deems normatively desirable. But a divergence
between an observer’s preferences and those of a chooser cannot be meaningfully conceptualized as a willpower
issue unless dissonance is experienced by the chooser himself.
25
Jon Elster, Introduction in THE MULTIPLE SELF 1, 6 (Jon Elster ed., 1985) (observing that "compulsive,
rigid, rule-governed behavior can also be a form of weakness of will") (citing DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON
ACTIONS AND EVENTS 30 (1980)); see also sources cited in supra note 17.
26
Even drug addiction can be modeled as the product of rational choice. See Gary S. Becker and Kevin M.
Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POLIT. ECON. 675 (1988). Of course, scholars have questioned the
extent to which addiction actually fits the rational model. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is
Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q. J. ECON. 1261 (2001).
27
However, the preferences that cause an individual to view a plan of extreme consumption as optimal
might be viewed as "expensive tastes" that make a person less well off than she would be if she did not have them.
For discussion of the distributive justice implications of expensive tastes, see Ronald Dworkin, What is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 301-04 (1981); Daniel Markovits,
How Much Redistribution Should There Be? 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2313-23 (2003). I thank Noah Zatz for
suggesting this connection.
28
Usages vary. Compare Hagger, et al., supra note 2, at 496 n.1 (listing “willpower” among the “terms often
considered synonymous with self-control”) with Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs, Willpower, Choice, and
Self-Control, in TIME AND DECISION 201, 202-04 (George Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003) (using "willpower" to
refer to a particular theory of self-control).
29
See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Willpower: A Decision-Theorist's Perspective, 19 LAW & PHIL. 51, 52
(2000) [hereinafter Loewenstein, Willpower] ("The concept of willpower suggests that there is some part of the
self that needs to be controlled to do what another part of the self wants"); Elster, supra note 25, at 6 (1985)
(explaining that "weakness of will" is a concept that "requires both that there is a conflict between two opposed
wishes, and that the wish that the person himself judges to be the more decisive loses out"); Richard H. Thaler &
Hersh M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392, 393-94 (1981) (observing that the
notion of self-control would be "paradoxical" without the concept of two selves) (quoting DONALD MCINTOSH,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIETY (1969)). The concurrent divided self that features in concepts of
willpower can be distinguished from a series of temporally sequential selves. See Elster, supra note 25, at 14-15
(observing that if a person fails to do what he believes "is best, all things considered," the problem suggests "some
split in the mind" or "a divided self" but "there is no need to talk about successive selves"). The two selves can be
characterized in various ways. See, e.g., Thaler & Shefrin, supra ("planner" and "doer"); Richard A. Posner, Are
We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 25 (1997)
(discussing conflicts between the "future-oriented" or "adult" self and the "present-oriented" or "child" self); see
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preferences30 (which are often, but not always, explained by reference to
hyperbolic discounting)31 are not the same thing as willpower lapses, but
are often symptomatic of them. To take a standard example, many people
who would prefer $105 in 366 days to $100 in $365 days would turn down
the chance for $105 tomorrow in favor of $100 today—even though the
length of the delay and the difference in the rewards is identical in the two
cases.32 Such preference reversals may occur if the internal "controller"
who initially selected the larger, later reward lacks the power to stop
immediate consumption when it becomes available. However, if someone
naively switches preferences as a choice approaches and neither foresees
that this will occur nor understands that it undermines her own long-run
plans, the problem does not, strictly speaking, implicate willpower.
Similarly, forms of myopia or hyperopia that merely alter the perceived size
of future rewards without producing any awareness of the distortion would
not represent willpower shortfalls.33
Third, low willpower is distinct from, although entangled with, other
cognitive and computational limits.34 Such limits, along with imperfect
information and uncertainty about the future, may cause people to guess
wrong about the best available pattern of consumption and aim their
willpower efforts at the wrong target. However, the increment of harm
caused by the miscalculation cannot be attributed to low willpower.35 One
also Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999) (modeling a
“long-run perspective” in which each period is weighted equally); Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, A DualSelf Model of Impulse Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2006) (discussing past two-self models and presenting
one in which a long-run self interacts with a series of short-run selves). A related idea is that of "hot states" and
"cold states"; one might view the former as instances in which the long-range or "planner" self is given little
deference. See George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM. ECON. REV.
(papers and proceedings). 426, 428–29 (2000) (discussing the "hot/cold empathy gap" as an inability to predict
this shift in internal control).
30
Economic work on time inconsistency traces back to R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic
Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1955). For a helpful review of work on time discounting and
time-inconsistent preferences, see Frederick et al., supra note 20.
31
On hyperbolic discounting, see, e.g., GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 32 & fig. 2B (2001)
(describing and depicting hyperbolic discounting); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112
Q. J. OF ECON. 443 (1997) (modeling preference reversals using a quasi-hyperbolic discount function). For
alternative explanations of preference reversals, see, e.g., Daniel Read, Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or
Subadditive? 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2001); Ariel Rubinstein, “Economics and Psychology?” The Case of
Hyperbolic Discounting, 44 INTERNAT’L ECON. REV. 1207 (2003).
32
See, e.g., Frederick et al., supra note 20, at 25; O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 29, at 103 (discussing
“present-biased preferences”).
33
See Elster, supra note 25, at 15-16 (observing that "myopia need not be a case of weakness of the will"
and citing instances where people have consistently short-sighted preferences and do not perceive any
intertemporal dilemma). Nonetheless, “myopia” and “hyperopia” are commonly used to reference selfacknowledged deviations from a better available consumption path.
34
See B. Douglas Bernheim, Taxing and Saving, NBER Working Paper No. 7061 (March 1999) at 36
(distinguishing self-control issues from those involving bounded rationality, and explaining that the latter "arise
from the complexity of intertemporal planning"). However, the two do interact. See id. at 38 (noting that selfcontrol models involve complex interactions among current and future selves that "accentuate the problems
associated with cognitive limitations").
35
It is even possible that miscalculations and low willpower will offset each other. See, e.g., Besharov,
supra note 15; Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalist Slopes, 2 NYU J. LAW & LIBERTY 411,
427-28 (2007). For example, people who erroneously believe that they should save more than is actually
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of the areas in which people may miscalculate, of course, is in gauging their
own future susceptibility to self-control problems. A person who does not
recognize in advance the existence or extent of her willpower vulnerabilities
can still suffer from low willpower.36 All that is necessary is that the person
have in mind a (subjectively) superior choice before failing to opt for it.
While a miscalculation about willpower is not itself a failure of willpower,
it can complicate remedial efforts.
Defining willpower in the way I have here makes failures of willpower
deeply subjective, internal phenomena.37 This understanding fits well with
how most people understand the term, but it also raises issues for public
policy. Because willpower lapses are observationally equivalent to
intertemporal choices that are produced by preferences or errors, willpower
can only be treated as a distinct phenomenon if it is possible to develop
workable proxies, information-forcing mechanisms, or other tools to
improve or substitute for direct observation. Even more fundamentally,
however, we need to pinpoint the kinds of harms willpower problems cause
before we can determine the policy relevance of willpower heterogeneity.
The next sections explore that question.
B. Self-Control and Consumption Choices Over Time
To understand the significance of willpower for well-being, it is
necessary to step back and consider consumption over time more generally.
1. The Life-Cycle Model
The dominant economic model for understanding consumption
decisions over time is the permanent income hypothesis or the related lifecycle model (which, although they differ in some particulars, I will here
refer to collectively as the "life-cycle hypothesis").38 On this account, an
necessary could be benefited by willpower lapses that move them closer to the correct target. See, e.g., Besharov,
supra note 15, at 12-13 (citing Matthew Rabin, Comment, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT
ECONOMICS 247 (Henry Aaron, ed., 1999)). Similarly, people may choose to remain “strategically ignorant”
about actual risks if their inflated beliefs help to fortify their own willpower resolve. See Juan Carrillo & Thomas
Mariotti, Strategic Ignorance As a Self-Disciplining Device. 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 529 (2000).
36
See, e.g., O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 19 (considering a spectrum of self-awareness that includes
partial as well as full naivete about self-control problems); O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 29, at 104
(distinguishing those who are naive about their self-control problems from those who are sophisticated and
recognize the problem in advance).
37
This is not to say that the exercise of willpower might not be observable to some extent through
neuroscience, only that it cannot be reliably inferred from behavioral outcomes. See sources cited in note 81; cf.
B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, in
THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS: A HANDBOOK 155, 189 (Andrew Caplin &
Andrew Schotter, eds., 2008) (noting the present inability to discern when a cognitive “mistake” occurs, and the
authors’ divergent views about the likely future role of neuroscience in making such judgments).
38
See MILTON FRIEDMAN: A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 25–31 (1957) (presenting the
permanent income hypothesis); Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption
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individual's consumption in a given period is not tied to that period's income
alone, but rather represents an optimal consumption level given the person's
lifetime earnings.39 Whether income arrives steadily or irregularly, people
calibrate their consumption in the same way—or so the story goes. This
activity is referred to as "consumption smoothing" based on the
commonplace assumption that optimal consumption is likely to be
significantly smoother than earning patterns.
If people experience
diminishing marginal returns to consumption within each period and the
height and shape of the marginal utility curve remains unchanged over the
life cycle, people will tend to do best by spreading out their consumption
rather than letting it track income or intentionally piling it into large
heaps.40 Of course, marginal returns to consumption are likely to be higher
in some periods than others, so that perfect smoothing will not be optimal.41
For example, if we examine matters at the household level, we would need
to take into account periods in which dependent children are present.42 It is
also possible that certain large lumps of consumption will be so highly
valued by some individuals that the opposite of consumption smoothing—
consumption lumping—would be optimal.43
Despite these complications and the concomitant difficulty in discerning
whether any particular real-world consumption pattern is optimal,44 research
suggests that actual consumption is more sensitive to the timing of income
streams than would be predicted by the life-cycle model.45 Although
willpower shortfalls doubtless play a role, there are many other reasons why
this might be the case. First, imperfect capital markets present liquidity
constraints; thus, people are not always able to move money earlier in
time.46 Similarly, incomplete insurance markets may force people to push
more money into the future as a precaution than they would if all
Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 388 (Kenneth K. Kurihara
ed., 1954) (presenting the life-cycle model). See also ALAN E.H. SPEIGHT, CONSUMPTION, RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS AND LIQUIDITY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 52-53 (1989) (discussing these models and some
differences between them).
39
See, e.g., Modigliani & Brumberg, supra note 38, at 392 ("The rate of consumption in any given period is
a facet of a plan which extends over the balance of the individual's life, while the income accruing within the same
period is but one element which contributes to the shaping of such a plan."); ANGUS DEATON, UNDERSTANDING
CONSUMPTION 26 (1992) (according to the life-cycle hypothesis, "consumption patterns are shaped by tastes and
life-cycle needs, and not by the temporal pattern of life-cycle labor income").
40
See, e.g., Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 8 & n.26.
41
See, e.g., DEATON, supra note 39, at 5, 26.
42
See id. at 5 (suggesting that because marginal utility of consumption is higher for a household that
includes more people, "the life-cycle pattern of household consumption can be expected to have the same general
shape as the life-cycle pattern of household size").
43
See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 765-66.
44
See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic
Theory, 58 U. CHI. LAW REV. 1275, 1310-11 (“Any argument that a given savings level is or is not optimal must
ultimately appeal to intuitions, such as that about the low likelihood that steeply declining lifetime consumption
maximizes utility.”).
45
See, e.g., DEATON, supra note 39, at 87-103; Angeletos et al., supra note 18, at 534-36; Fennell & Stark,
supra note 5, at 16-20.
46
See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 31, at 233-35; DEATON, supra note 39, at 162-63.
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uncertainty could be adequately hedged.47 Conversely, risk and uncertainty
might at times push people toward consuming earlier than they would
otherwise prefer. For example, one reason for consuming now rather than
later is that one cannot be sure one will be alive later to engage in
consumption.48
Even within the realm of cognition, more is going on than willpower.
Hersh Shefrin and Richard Thaler's "behavioral life-cycle hypothesis,"
which incorporates widely observed cognitive phenomena not accounted for
in the standard life-cycle model, takes into account not only timeinconsistent preferences but also features like optimism and mental
accounting that may drive a wedge between optimal and actual
consumption.49 Some divergences from the life-cycle model's predictions
stem from computational limits; faced with the enormous complexity of
arranging one's lifetime consumption, people often resort to simple
heuristics or rules of thumb.50 Uncertainty can also interact with cognitive
biases to produce choices that deviate from the predictions of the life-cycle
model. People may mispredict how their marginal utility of consumption
will change in the future—or how it might do so contingent on uncertain
events, like changes in health status or the death of family members.51 For
47

See, e.g., DEATON, supra note 39at 34-37, 197; Christopher D. Carroll, Buffer-Stock Saving and the Life
Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1997); KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RISK-BEARING 134-43 (1971). Shaviro, supra note 3, at 772-73. Borrowing constraints interact with risk. See
DEATON, supra note 39, at 197 (describing "[t]he ability to borrow in bad times" as "in insurance device for at
least some consumers, and if this mechanism is closed off, additional provision must be made for such
eventualities"). More generally, the distributive work of taxation is only necessary because of incomplete
insurance markets (here, for ability). Shaviro, supra note 3, at 757 (citing DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, 52 (2000)); see also David A. Weisbach, Toward a New Approach to Disability Law,
2009 U CHI. LEGAL FORUM 47, 74 (“Designing a tax system . . . is very much like designing an optimal insurance
policy”) (footnote omitted); Dworkin, supra note 27, at 314-23 (examining the implications of hypothetical
insurance markets for skill).
48
See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 7, at 660-69. Similarly, choosers who are uncertain about whether the
person or entity offering them an intertemporal choice will really follow through on the delayed alternative as
promised may find it safer to take a smaller reward immediately, even if they would prefer the larger, later reward.
This seems to be the best explanation of the often-cited "puzzle" of people failing to buy energy efficient
appliances whose higher initial cost would be more than repaid by cheaper operating costs. See George
Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, in CHOICE
OVER TIME 119, 137-38 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster, eds., 1992) (citing studies inferring high discount
rates based on choices about consumer durables). Well acquainted with puffery and claims that turn out not to
match up with their own experiences, consumers may find it safer to take the savings up front rather than count on
them to materialize later. See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at (suggesting that the
studies like those on energy efficient appliances often "involve choices in which the discount rate may be
confounded by a lack of information").
49
Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 609
(1988).
50
See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1075-81 (2000) (citing and discussing literature
on this point).
51
See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 7, at 669-70. Research supports a “projection bias” that limits people’s
ability to know how they will feel under different conditions, including quite common states such as hunger.
George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1209 (2003); see also
Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
35: 345-411 (2003).
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example, a young person who puts off expensive travel may be operating on
the assumption that she will get the same amount of pleasure from traveling
in her later years; if this turns out to be untrue, the delay will have made her
worse off. Significantly, this is not a question of willpower, even though
the pattern may look hyperopic. Rather, it stems from one's inability to
determine one's optimal consumption plan under external constraints.
As the foregoing example suggests, the notion of a consumption plan
that would maximize an individual’s lifetime well-being within the bounds
of external limits lurks in the background of willpower discussions.
Explicitly developing this idea of an “optimal available consumption plan”
or “OACP” offers a useful starting point for thinking precisely about what
willpower lapses cost.
2. Anatomy of an OACP
Willpower has the intriguing property of mediating between a person's
own best-laid plans and her ability to advance them. But sometimes those
best-laid plans do not, in fact, represent a path to higher lifetime well-being.
If our interest is in the effect of willpower heterogeneity on well-being, we
would want to know how much willpower lapses cost individuals in lost
utility over the life cycle. This requires filtering out the costs that come
from aiming at the wrong target and netting out the gains that come from
failing, through lack of willpower, to advance wrongheaded goals. In other
words, willpower lapses produce disutility only to the extent that they
interfere with an individual's pursuit of her OACP. An individual's OACP
can be roughly defined as the most-preferred consumption plan that is
available to that individual, given external constraints (such as budget and
liquidity constraints and limits on risk reallocation). Individuals are also
subject to the prevailing legal regime, which may withdraw certain desired
choices and influence others through taxes, subsidies, or other
mechanisms.52 Both the individual's OACP and the individual's actual
consumption pattern must fit within these constraints.
The question of willpower enters into the picture only within the range
of freedom that these external constraints leave open. The more limited that
compass, the less heterogeneity in willpower will matter.53 At the extreme,
imagine a person who has no ability to borrow money and earns only
enough each day to keep body and soul together. Such a person's actual
consumption pattern will hew closely to her OACP regardless of her
52
See Laibson, supra note 23, at 2 (distinguishing a person who cannot achieve optimal savings due to selfcontrol problems from someone who rationally chooses the savings level that is optimal in light of a given
"inefficient tax environment").
53
Thus, as we will see, one response to willpower heterogeneity might be to toughen external constraints, as
through legal restrictions that remove certain consumption options. See infra Parts II.C and III.D.
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willpower level, because external constraints produce an OACP that is so
tightly fitted to her survival needs that no other plausible pathway beckons.
Likewise, loosening borrowing constraints will have different impacts on
different individuals, depending on their willpower levels.54 For some, it
removes a binding constraint and makes possible a better approximation of
the optimal lifetime consumption plan; for others, it merely facilitates a
wider divergence from that plan.55 Similarly, people with front-loaded lifecycle earnings (such as child actors or professional athletes) have more to
lose from willpower lapses than those who receive money later in time,
holding all else equal.56
A remaining question is what the term "optimal" means in the context of
an OACP. To say that an optimal plan is one that is best by the individual's
own lights gains us little ground if the individual has time-inconsistent
consumption preferences. We must make some judgment about which of
the "selves" is to be viewed as authoritative on the question.57 Where short
run impulses threaten to derail long range planning, it might seem
reasonable to grant priority to the long-run self.58 But the fact that people
make mistakes not only in the direction of overconsumption but also in the
direction of underconsumption may cast doubt on the planner's authority.
Putting matters in terms of a thought experiment may help: the individual's
OACP is that plan which an assembly of all temporal selves would accept
as at least as desirable as any other alternative, assuming that the relevant
bargains and side-payments among selves could be arranged.59 In other
words, one plan trumps another if the selves who get their way under it win
54
See, e.g., M. Keith Chen & Alan Schwartz, Intertemporal Choice and Legal Constraints, Yale L. & Econ.
Res. Pap. No. 381 (April 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396333, at 4-5.
55
See Laibson, supra note 31, at 465-67 (explaining how increased liquidity could actually be welfare
reducing for consumers who would like to use illiquid assets, such as their homes, as commitment devices).
56
See Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 29, at 401 (observing that athletes' "declining income stream creates a
difficult self-control problem in the high-income years").
57
See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, 3 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 83 (noting
difficulty in determining which self's preferences should have priority when both "appear to be equally
voluntary"); Chrisoula Andreou, Making a Clean Break: Addiction and Ulysses Contracts, 22 BIOETHICS 25, 2930 (2008) (analogizing granting priority to the choice preferred by most of the temporal selves to "mob rule");
Eric Rasmusen, Internalities and Paternalism: Applying the Compensation Criterion to Multiple Selves Across
Time, draft at 15 (May 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129824 (discussing literature on whether to
privilege an earlier self who wishes to precommit and suggesting that "what is special about Self 0 is that he is
making a choice about something before it becomes a present decision"); Glen Whitman, Against the New
Paternalism: Internalities and the Economics of Self-Control, Policy Analysis No. 563, Cato Institute (2006) at 1,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa563.pdf (contending that "internality theory in its current form unjustifiably 'takes
sides' when it chooses to favor some personal interests over others").
58
Much work on time-inconsistent preferences adopts this perspective, whether explicitly or implicitly. See,
e.g., Gruber & Köszegi, supra note 26, at 1287. For a critique, see Whitman, supra note 57.
59
If the side payments were actually made, the results would be Pareto efficient, leaving no selves worse off
and at least one self better off. See, e.g., Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare,
Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
10345
(2004),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10345 (applying an intrapersonal Pareto criterion); O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra
note 29, at 112-13 (discussing and critiquing the use of intraself Pareto efficiency to assess welfare). See also
Whitman, supra note 57 (applying Coasean analysis to internal bargaining).
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enough to compensate the selves who lose out.60 The composite preferences
that would emerge from this hypothetical bargain among selves form the
conceptual baseline against which we can assess the well-being costs of
willpower failures.
It might seem more straightforward to use objective measures of wellbeing to assess the costs of willpower lapses.61 Yet presumably our reason
for caring about willpower lapses as such (rather than merely as a subset of
poor decisions that we might wish to regulate for other reasons) derives
from the capacity of those lapses to undermine a person's own best-laid
plans. While an OACP is a construct that real-world individuals do not and
could not have full access to, willpower is only interesting to the extent that
people can at least roughly identify the path that is best for them. If people
are utterly misguided about what is best for them, then we are dealing not
with a problem of self-control but rather with an entirely different set of
issues that willpower-related policies cannot address.
3. Willpower Heterogeneity and Lifetime Well-Being
The life-cycle hypothesis makes strong implicit assumptions about the
continuity of personal identity throughout life and the degree of resource
sharing that occurs among a person's various temporal selves.62 These
assumptions break down for many reasons, as we have seen. In comparing
the well-being of two people over their lifetimes,63 we must examine not
only their lifetime earnings, but also how well they can leverage those
earnings into utility. This depends in turn on their ability to arrange
consumption optimally within the life cycle,64 which, among other things,
60

This would amount to the application of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion to the intrapersonal realm.
See Rasmusen, supra note 57, at 15-21 (developing and applying an "intraself Kaldor-Hicks criterion"); see also
O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 29, at 113 (constructing a “long-run perspective” based on “a (fictitious) period
0 where the person has no decision to make and weights all future periods equally”).
61
For a defense of an objective theory of well-being, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of WellBeing and the Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2003).
62
See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal Identity over Time, 62 TAX LAW REV. 333, 348-51
(2009) (noting and critiquing assumptions underlying a lifetime approach to taxation). There are large
philosophical questions surrounding the degree to which an individual remains relevantly "the same person" over
the course of a lifetime. See e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984); Shane Frederick, Time
Preference and Personal Identity, in TIME AND DECISION 89 (George Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003); David
Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics (last revised Mar. 5, 2008). For a discussion of the implications of
identity over time for tax policy, see generally Zelenak; see also Adler, supra note 6, at 50-53.
63
There is an antecedent question of whether the lifetime is right unit of analysis for evaluating and
comparing well-being. See Adler, supra note 6; see also PARFIT, supra note 62, at 343-44 (examining the
significance for distributive justice of personal identity over time) (quoting and discussing THOMAS NAGEL,
MORTAL QUESTIONS 124-25 n.16 (1979) ); Zelenak, supra note 62, at 342-33 (discussing Parfit’s view of how
matters of identity impact the analysis of distributive questions).
64
Here it becomes relevant that well-being in different periods is not additively separable, meaning that we
cannot simply add up each year’s utility in isolation and examine the total. See Adler supra note 6, at 13-14;
DEATON, supra note 39, at 15-17 (discussing the assumption of additive separability that is sometimes used in
formal treatments and its shortcomings, as well as some ways that economists have built nonadditivity into
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depends on willpower.
It is well understood that people with identical lifetime earnings but
different earning patterns may have different consumption patterns and
hence different lifetime utility levels.65 What this paper hopes to emphasize
is the following additional point: Two people with identical lifetime
earnings and identical earning patterns (as well as identical external
constraints on borrowing and insuring,66 and identical computational and
predictive capacities) could nonetheless experience very different levels of
lifetime well-being owing to willpower-related differences in their ability to
allocate consumption within the life cycle. It is these differences that I will
explore here.
C. The Costs of Willpower Lapses
Willpower lapses carry obvious costs when they cause people’s
consumption patterns to diverge from their OACPs. But we must also take
into account the costs incurred (whether successfully or not) to prevent
failures of will from happening.67 Some recent scholarship helpfully
explores the problem in terms of intrapersonal transaction costs that keep
temporal selves from frictionlessly working out their differences.68 As in
the interpersonal case, intrapersonal transaction costs generate two potential
problems. First is a concern that the conflict will never reach an efficient
resolution—the higher valuing user will not get the entitlement.69 Just as a
models). Preferences for improvement over time and adaptive effects make utility sequences and patterns highly
relevant to lifetime utility. See, e.g., DEATON, supra note 39, at 16 (explaining that "[a]dditivity rules out
phenomena such as habit formation"); Adler supra note 6, at 13 (observing that, among other things, "[a]dditive
separability rules out the possibility of an improvement effect – namely that a life where facts with respect to
some aspect of well-being get better over time is better just by virtue of this improvement"). A large body of
empirical work establishes that improving sequences are generally preferred over flat or declining ones. See, e.g.,
Frederick et al., supra note 20, at 28-29 (reviewing literature); Dan Ariely & Ziv Carmon, Summary Assessment
of Experiences: the Whole is Different from the Sum of Its Parts, in TIME AND DECISION 327 (George
Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003) (observing that "one of the most robust findings in research about assessment of
experiences is the clear preference for improvement over time" and collecting citations to studies establishing this
preference); George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Preferences for Sequences of Outcomes, 100 PSYCH. REV. 91
(1993).
65
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 6, at 52 (discussing this point and citing literature supporting it). The point is
easiest to see if we imagine that income tends to be temporally “sticky,” in the sense that it is consumed within (or
relatively near) the period in which it is earned rather than being equally available throughout the life cycle.
66
I refer here to initial limits on borrowing and insuring given income and earning patterns. Low-willpower
people might experience a constriction (or, in some contexts, an expansion) of credit based on their observed
patterns of spending and repaying. Similarly, insurance costs might go up if, for example, lack of willpower
translates into impulsive risk-seeking behavior that insurers can observe.
67
Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). Calabresi emphasized that the costs of accident
prevention and administrative costs, as well as the harms caused by the accidents themselves, must be taken into
account. Id. at 26-31. I will not address administrative costs explicitly here, but the policy alternatives discussed
in Parts III and IV, as well as private or self-administered approaches to willpower, should be assessed in light of
this consideration.
68
See, e,g., Whitman, supra note 57; see also Rasmusen, supra note 57 (analyzing potential intraself
bargains); AINSLIE, supra note 31, at 105-16 (discussing intrapersonal bargaining).
69
Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1119 (1972).
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factory might be forced to shut down when it would be efficient for it to
continue operating, or allowed to continue when it would be efficient for it
to shut down, an individual might, say, smoke when it is not efficient for
her to do so (in terms of fulfilling her own lifetime preferences), or she
might fail to smoke when it would be efficient for her to do so (if the
pleasure from smoking actually outweighs the long-term risks).70
A second concern relates to the resources that are wasted in the course
of transacting.71 Just as wrangling among neighbors over the factory's
operation consumes resources, so too does wrangling among selves. Even if
the entitlement does ultimately reach the higher valuing user, resources will
be dissipated in the transfer process.72 These two categories of costs, which
I will call “failure costs” and “exercise costs,” respectively, are examined in
the following sections—along with a third category, “erosion costs,” that
relates to the effects over time of patterns of willpower exertions and
failures.73
1. Failure Costs
Willpower failures are both ubiquitous and varied. In some cases, these
failures may impose no costs, or may actually confer benefits, if other errors
have caused people to aim their willpower efforts at the wrong target.74 In
general, however, we think that willpower lapses move people away from
their OACPs, typically by causing them to consume earlier than they (in
their composite deliberative states) would prefer. People who are aware of
their own propensity to consume too early may adopt personal financial
rules or other precommitment mechanisms.75 These approaches may enable
them to attain better results than through unstructured consumption but may
still fall short of the optimal plan (whether by undershooting, overshooting,
or doing some of both).76 For these reasons and others, people may actually
consume later than they would prefer or ultimately consume less on a
lifetime basis than they would prefer.77
Other willpower shortfalls involve choices among goods or activities.
70

See Whitman, supra note 57, at 4-5.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 706-07 (9th ed. 2008).
72
See id.
73
I introduced this taxonomy in prior work. See Fennell, supra note 13. Although I am unaware of this
precise breakdown appearing elsewhere, the underlying ideas are not new; all three types of costs are wellrecognized in the literature.
74
This is one of several ways in which cognitive errors might offset each other. See generally Besharov,
supra note 15.
75
See, e.g., Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 29, at 397-98; GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS 142-73 (1992);
Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Willpower and Personal Rules, 112 J. POL. ECON. 848 (2004).
76
See, e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 75 (discussing possibility that people will precommit to an
underspending regime); AINSLIE, supra note 31, at 143-60.
77
See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE
118 (1992) (noting lower-than-expected rates of dissaving among the elderly).
71
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For example, willpower is often exerted in the domains of food, tobacco,
alcohol, and exercise not simply to rearrange a fixed quantum of
consumption within the life cycle but rather to change the total amounts and
mixes of the goods that are consumed. Thus, willpower failures may cause
people to consume things they would prefer not to consume at all (such as
cigarettes or mindless television shows) or fail to consume at all things that
they would like to consume (such as a vacation to Alaska or a college
education). People may also, over a lifetime or some subset of it, consume
more or less of certain things (such as certain kinds of books or particular
types of foods) than they would prefer.78
The costs of willpower failures may extend beyond the individual by
impacting other people.79 As discussed later, it may also have implications
for the individual’s ability to resist future temptations.80
2. Exercise Costs
Although much remains to be learned about the operation of willpower,
a large and growing body of empirical research finds that it costs something
in cognitive terms to exercise self control.81 In one study, for example,
hungry participants who had to resist a plate of freshly-baked chocolate chip
cookies immediately before attempting a set of (unsolvable) puzzles gave
up more quickly on the puzzles than those permitted to eat the cookies and
those in a control condition involving no food at all.82 From this and similar
78
Consumption choices can dramatically affect the lifetime budget line, as where choices are made early in
life between working and loafing or between spending and saving. Thus, divergences from an initial OACP that
are produced by willpower lapses may produce a more constrained OACP over time. Conversely, willpower
skills developed early in life that alter consumption choices at young ages can expand the OACP over time.
79
This could occur through any number of channels. Some activities, like smoking, have direct spillovers
on others (second-hand smoke). Other activities may impact other individuals through avenues like health
insurance premia, contingent on the pooling and pricing rules in place. See, e.g., Jay Bhattacharya & Neeraj
Sood, Health Insurance and the Obesity Externality, in THE ECONOMICS OF OBESITY: VOL. 17, ADVANCES IN
HEALTH ECONOMICS AND SERVICES RESEARCH 279 (Kristian Bolin & John Cawley, eds, 2007). Another
intriguing possibility raised by recent empirical work is that certain effects like obesity could spread through
social networks. See Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social
Network over 32 Years, 357 N. ENGL. J. MED. 370 (2007); but see Ethan Cohen-Cole & Jason M. Fletcher, Is
Obesity Contagious? Social Networks v. Environmental Factors in the Obesity Epidemic, 27 J. HEALTH ECON.
1382 (2008) (challenging the social networks explanation).
80
See text accompanying notes 87-96, infra (discussing the impact of past willpower failures on the
likelihood of future failures as a type of “erosion cost”).
81
This appears to be true in a basic physiological sense. Recent work has linked the exercise of willpower to
the brain's use of glucose. See Matthew T. Gailliot & Roy F. Baumeister, The Physiology of Willpower: Linking
Blood Glucose to Self-Control, 4 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCH. REV. 303 (2007); Matthew Gailliot et al.,
Self-Control Relies on Glucose as a Limited Energy Source: Willpower Is More Than a Metaphor, 92 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 325 (2007).
82
Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource? 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 1252 (1998). The subjects who had to resist the cookies were instructed to eat radishes instead,
ostensibly as part of a study of taste. Other subjects were instructed to eat the cookies (or, alternatively, some
chocolate candies) rather than the radishes. In both cases, the subjects were left alone with both kinds of food, so
that those told to eat radishes could have sneaked some cookies instead. Interestingly, none did so—although
some "radish condition" subjects went so far as to pick up and sniff the cookies. Id. at 1255.

29-Oct-10]

WILLPOWER TAXES

17

studies, researchers have concluded that, in the short run at least,83
willpower works like a muscle that can become fatigued with use.84 More
broadly, self-control seems to share a common, limited, depletable fund
with other cognitive tasks, such as decisionmaking.85 Although the
empirical work in this area leaves some a number of important questions
unanswered,86 and ongoing work suggests some qualifications,87 the notion
that willpower exertions are taxing seems quite robust.88
If the stock of willpower is limited in the relatively short run, people
may maximize overall intertemporal success by "giving in" to relatively
innocuous temptations.89 Thus, we may see in some willpower lapses the
analogue of "rational ignorance" in the realms of decisionmaking and
information gathering.90 If successfully applying willpower simply costs
too much in a given setting, whether because it reduces willpower in other
domains or generally depletes mental and emotional resources that would
otherwise be used to advance important personal or career goals, it might
seem that people should “choose their battles” and exhibit occasional
willpower lapses.91
83

The long run story seems to be rather different. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Baumeister et al., supra note 82, at 1255; Hagger et al., supra note 2 (providing a meta-analysis
of studies). Other studies involved initial tasks like suppressing a particular thought (such as of a “white bear”) or
particular emotions (in reaction to sad and comic movies). Mark Muraven et al., Self-Control as Limited
Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 774 (1998). In each case, these acts
worsened subsequent performance on a cognitive or endurance task. See id.; see also Baumeister & Vohs, supra
note 28 (discussing studies).
85
See, e.g., Baumeister et al., supra note 82; Kathleen D. Vohs, et al., Making Choices Impairs Subsequent
Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation and Active Initiative, 94 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 883 (2008); see also Shiv & Fedorikhhin 1999.
86
See, e.g., , Eric J. Johnson, Man, My Brain Is Tired: Linking Depletion and Cognitive Effort in Choice, 18
J. CONSUM. PSYCHOL 14 (2008) (providing a concise overview of some of the literature’s unanswered questions
and ongoing debates); Hagger et al., supra note 2 (examining alternative explanations, moderating factors, and
possible extensions of the depletion model).
87
For example, Dewitte et al. (2009) found that self-control enhancement rather than depletion occurred
when two tasks drawing on the same control processes followed each other in succession.
88
See Emre Ozdenoren et al., Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges, Working Paper,
January 2008, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~emreo/willpower.pdf (discussing this literature and
modeling willpower as a depletable resource that can be drawn down by previous willpower exercises).
89
See Loewenstein, Willpower, supra note 29, at 61 (characterizing willpower as "a constrained resource"
the efficient use of which requires that it "be allocated selectively between alternative uses"); Ozdenoren et al.,
supra note 88 (modeling this allocation process); Hagger et al., supra note 2, at 518 (discussing “conservation” of
self-control reserves).
90
See, e.g., HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON HUMAN
BEHAVIOR AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21 (2008) ("Perfection in decision making is infinitely costly
and consuming of time, so we are wise to accept a positive probability of error and even wiser to tolerate higher
probabilities if the cost of reducing error is greater"); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL.
ECON. 213, 224 (1961) ("Ignorance is like subzero weather; by a sufficient expenditure its effects upon people can
be kept within tolerable or even comfortable bounds, but it would be wholly uneconomic entirely to eliminate all
its effects.").
91
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue apply a "choosing your battles" approach to reduce another category of costs:
those that come from self-imposed nonpecuniary penalties, such as fear and guilt, applied to willpower lapses.
George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way": Negative Emotions,
Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 186-87, 204 fig. 2; id. at 192-93, 206 fig. 4 (2006)
(explaining and illustrating how "guilt-free zones" could assist in reducing certain costs associated with
attempting to resist temptations that ultimately prove irresistible). Perhaps for these reasons, some exercise
regimens and diets expressly contemplate “cheat days.” I thank Leandra Lederman for this example.
84
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However, the costs associated with exercising self-control on a given
occasion represent only part of the story. Patterns of exertions over time
can influence the costliness of later exertions, and a willpower success or
failure in one instance may carry implications for the odds of succeeding or
failing in later instances. For example, one of the primary mechanisms for
reducing exercise costs is the use of personal rules.92 What makes these
rules effective is their ability to raise the stakes for any given lapse by
bundling together a group of similar decisions.93 But, as a result, a lapse
may "set a precedent" and lead to further lapses.94 Dieters, for example,
may conclude after giving in to a piece of cake that "the diet is 'blown'" (at
least for the day) and that there is no additional harm to eating as much as
they like.95 Thus, lapses that seem cost-justified on a given occasion may
be dangerous, unless they can be psychologically firewalled off from later,
similar occasions for which willpower will be needed.96
Alternatively, people might try to reduce exercise costs by making
certain that tempting choices are simply unavailable.97 This strategy, too,
could backfire, if one's willpower level is mutable over time. The next
section explains.
3. Erosion Costs
As the discussion above suggested, exercise costs (and, by extension,
failure costs) may change over time as a result of patterns of exertions.
Muscles not only become tired but can also get stronger with regular use;
these same characteristics appear to apply to willpower.98 If exerting
willpower makes one better at it, then efforts to avoid temptations
altogether may prove counterproductive. A related possibility is that
willpower can be developed by employing particular techniques. For
example, studies involving children and delayed gratification suggest that
92

See, e.g., AINSLIE, supra note 31, at 112-13.
See, e.g., id.; AINSLIE, supra note 75, at 142-73; Bénabou & Tirole supra note 75.
See, e.g., George Ainslie, Beyond Microeconomics: Conflict Among Interests in a Multiple Self as a
Determinant of Value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 133, 147 (Jon Elster ed., 1985); Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 75,
at 851-56; Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic Approach, In THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS, VOL. 1, RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 137, 151-59 (Isabelle Brocas
and Juan Carrillo eds, 2003).
95
C. Peter Herman & Janet Polivy, Dieting as an Exercise in Behavioral Economics, in TIME AND DECISION
459, 467-71 (George Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003).
96
See, e.g., Ainslie, supra note 94, at 148-49. An interesting question prompted by this line of reasoning is
whether tax policy could itself structure opportunities for "controlled lapses." Cf. Fennell, supra note 17, at 15152 (discussing the possibility that tax refunds offer such a bounded exception): Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra
note 91, 192-93, 206 fig. 4 (discussing and depicting the effects of "guilt-free zones").
97
For the potential gains that might come from reducing one's choice set, see, e.g., Gul & Pesendorfer, supra
note 198.
98
See, e.g., Loewenstein, Willpower, supra note 29, at 56-57; Siegfried Dewitte et al., Self-Control
Performance Enhances Self-Control Performance at Similar Tasks (April 2006); Ozdenoren et al., supra note 88,
at 24-25.
93
94
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people can be taught skills that enhance their ability to wait, such as
pretending they are looking at a picture of a treat rather than the actual treat,
or distracting themselves from the temptation.99
The idea that willpower can be “built up,” or, alternatively, that it can
atrophy or erode, has received attention in the literature.100 In recent
experimental work, Muraven et al. found evidence of a willpower “strength
training” effect among participants who were assigned to practice certain
self-control tasks, such as maintaining good posture, over a two week
period in between two experimental sessions.101 Conversely, if failing to
exercise willpower erodes the stock of self-control that can be accessed on
future occasions, then the long-run strategy for minimizing failure costs and
exercise costs may involve incurring more of both than could be justified
based on a short-run evaluation.102
Additional empirical work might be directed not only at investigating
the longer-term effects of exercising willpower, but also the broader cultural
spread of willpower norms. For example, although different age cohorts
exhibit different savings behaviors and monetary attitudes,103 we know little
about the intergenerational or societal transmission of willpower.
D. Understanding Willpower Heterogeneity
Although intertemporal struggles are universal, willpower problems do
not affect everyone to the same degree. This is due in part to circumstances
unrelated to willpower itself, such as opportunities for temptation, but
individuals also differ in how they respond to the same circumstances. Put
99
For an overview of this literature, see Walter Mischel, et al., Sustaining Delay of Gratification over Time:
A Hot-Cool Systems Perspective, in TIME AND DECISION 175, 183-87 (George Loewenstein et al., eds., 2003).
100
See, e.g., Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 667 (1992)
(raising and countering the argument that precommitment would "undermine self-discipline and thwart the goals
of moral strength and virtue"); id. at 666 & n.36 (discussing the related argument that placing alternatives out of
reach will deprive consumers of learning opportunities and the related strengthening of "moral fiber" and
connecting this point to Mills's "'moral muscles argument' against paternalism"); Jonathan Klick & Gregory
Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 162627 (2006) (suggesting that paternalistic policies present a variety of "cognitive hazards" and could "undercut
personal incentives to invest in cognitive capital").
101
Mark Muraven, et. al., Longitudinal Improvement of Self-Regulation Through Practice: Building SelfControl Strength Through Repeated Exercise, 139 J. SOC. PSYCH. 446 (1999). The study found that participants
who had exercised certain forms of self-control were less vulnerable to depletion effects. The authors concluded
that, “[i]t is good to exert self-control on a regular basis because in the long run, these exercises will strengthen
self-control and make a person less susceptible to the depleting effects of a single exertion.” Id. at 456; see also
Hagger et. al., supra note 2, at 518 (discussing and citing additional literature on self-control “training” effects).
102
Some critics of interventions premised on cognitive shortfalls, including self-control, have emphasized
the possibility that these efforts would have unintended effects on learning or internal controls. See, e.g., Klick &
Mitchell, supra note 100, at 1631-32; Whitman & Rizzo, supra note 35, at 430-33; see also Benabou & Tirole,
supra note 94, at 155-56 (noting possibility that self-control might not develop as well under “tight external
constraints”).
103
For analyses of generational differences in views about money, see, e.g., PETER K. LUNT & SONIA M.
LIVINGSTONE, MASS CONSUMPTION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY 101-32 (1992); Teresa R. Daniel, Delay of
Consumption and Saving Behavior: Some Preliminary, Empirical Outcomes, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC
PSYCHOLOGY 171, 180 (Gerrit Antonides, W. Fred Van Raaij & Shlomo Maital eds., 1997).
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in the terms introduced above, people with self-control problems operate in
an intrapersonal environment marked by high transaction costs, while
people with high levels of willpower operate in an intrapersonal transaction
cost environment that more closely approximates the Coasean ideal.104
Alternatively, we might say that people have low willpower when their
exercise costs are unusually high relative to the efficacy of those exertions
in reducing failure costs. While everyone may suffer spikes in exercise
costs from time to time, people with low willpower levels may have
chronically elevated exercise costs due to some kind of vulnerability or past
erosion of willpower, or they may simply lack skills that would lower those
exercise costs systematically, such as the use of distraction techniques or
personal rules.105
Another way of looking at the problem would posit some sort of
communication breakdown between the "controller" self and the acting
self.106 The controller self cannot broker a deal between the current acting
self and various future selves because the acting self has become
unreachable or unamenable to bargaining, perhaps as a result of strong
visceral influences.107 While such communication breakdowns may happen
occasionally to everyone, we might regard those for whom they are
especially pronounced and frequent as having low willpower levels.
II. THREE APPROACHES TO WILLPOWER
How might tax policy best respond to willpower heterogeneity? I will
start by setting aside practical difficulties in observing willpower levels and
consider the question at the level of theory. Three divergent responses
come to mind. First, we might funnel resources to low-willpower types to
compensate them for their lower utility levels. Second, we might attempt to
turn low-willpower types into high-willpower types by using penalties or
subsidies to reprice gaps between their actual consumption patterns and
their OACPs. Third, we might try to directly deliver consumption outcomes
to the low-willpower crowd that more closely approximate those of the
high-willpower group by blocking or forcing certain consumption choices.
These strategies—compensation, repricing, and choice reduction—do not
exhaust the policy choice set, but they do offer useful starting points.
104
See supra note 68. This binary classification is a simplification; people obviously occupy a continuum
with respect to willpower and also exhibit variation within their own lives.
105
See text accompanying notes 92-99, supra.
106
See Elster, supra note 25, at 6 (positing some “breakdown of internal communication”).
107
See generally George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 64 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DEC. PROC. 272 (1996). The idea that future selves are represented in willpower struggles, albeit
imperfectly, is an implication of the “two self” model that is often used to model self-control problems. See, e.g.,
Zelenak supra note 62, at 368 n.164 (“fiduciary” role of long-run self); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE 94 (1984) (positing that absent future selves might have an “attorney” present).
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Elements of each can be seen in existing and proposed tax policies, as I
will discuss in Part III.
A. Compensating for Low Willpower
An equity-based rationale for reducing tax burdens on low-willpower
individuals can be approached from either of two directions.108 First,
willpower might be considered an element of ability,109 which is generally
taken to be the proper theoretical target of taxation.110 As a draw against a
stock of cognitive resources, willpower may substitute for the exercise of
other abilities in the paid labor market. On this account, exertions of
willpower are a form of nonmarket production, akin to untaxed production
that occurs within the home.111
Second, willpower levels may work as amplifiers or dampeners in
converting marketable talents and skills into well-being over the life cycle.
Holding income constant,112 low-willpower people are less able to achieve
the consumption plan that they deem best and are consequently less well off
than their high-willpower counterparts. If tax policy's distributive goals are
benchmarked to lifetime well-being, then those goals cannot be achieved
without somehow accounting for differences in willpower.113 But it is not
obvious which way this heterogeneity would cut. As Daniel Shaviro has
observed, the fact that myopia keeps some individuals from acting as good
consumers in translating income into utility could support either
108
An efficiency-based rationale might also apply if it turns out that low-willpower people have more elastic
labor supply than others. Cf. Michael Kremer, Should Taxes Be Independent of Age? (2001) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/kremer/papers.html.
109
A distinct argument would be that willpower signals something about ability. The related idea that
savings might serve as an "indicator good" has been explored. See Bankman and Weisbach, Superiority, supra
note 3, at 1453-55; Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear Income Taxation
and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 217, 227-28 (2002). I will not discuss this possibility here, since
using a particular trait as an indicator makes sense only when it is more readily observable than the real variable
of interest—which is likely not the case here.
110
For discussion of this point, see, e.g., Lawrence Zelanek, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE L.J. 1145 (2006);
Shaviro, supra note 3, at 752 (explaining that according to the optimal income tax literature, "the attribute of
interest is ability, whether or not exercised" but noting that this is still "one turtle shy" of the ultimate focus of tax
policy—the "effect on social welfare"). For an interesting analysis of how personal attributes other than ability
relate to tax progressivity, see Jeff Strnad, The Progressivity Puzzle: The Key Role of Personal Attributes, John M.
Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper 293 (August 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=10289 (examining the implications of “materialism” and “work affinity” for the tax rate
structure).
111
On the distributive effects of untaxed household production, see Chris William Sanchirico, Progressivity
and Potential Income: Measuring the Effect of Changing Work Patterns on Income Tax Progressivity, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1551 (2008).
112
The possibility that willpower may itself correlate with income or wealth levels is discussed below. See
notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
113
Indeed, the capacity to wring more lifetime welfare out of a given income stream would seem to be just
as relevant to tax policy's distributive goals as the talents and skills that produce the income stream in the first
place. Yet, tax policy does not ordinarily respond to heterogeneity in one's skill as a consumer. See Shaviro,
supra note 3, at 758; see also Warren, supra note 7, at 1096-97 (rejecting realized utility as an appropriate tax
base).
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redistribution toward the myopes (based on their lower total utility and their
potentially higher marginal utility) or, alternatively, shifting money away
from the myopes and toward those who are better able to generate utility
with the same resources.114 Where one comes out on this question depends
both on empirical assessments about marginal utility and on the social
welfare function in use.115
Either of these approaches might point in the direction of a tax policy
that compensates for low willpower. A principal counterargument would be
one of moral hazard. Because compensating people for low willpower
levels reduces the cost associated with being a low-willpower type, we
might expect to see more people of this type emerge over time. The size of
the response depends in part on the respective roles of effort and
endowment in producing willpower. If, as suggested above, the exercise of
willpower always requires at least some effort, then people might be
expected to shift their limited energies to other endeavors if self-control no
longer produces large marginal gains. A wrinkle here is that exertions of
effort that take place in the labor market are already taxed, so it is possible
that we already have inefficiently large expenditures of effort on untaxed
factors like willpower.116
Although the issues are complex, a concern remains that compensation
for low willpower levels would only serve to exacerbate the condition that
led to compensation in the first place.117 The design challenges resemble
those in other settings where social arrangements can influence the
"exchange rate" at which money is translated into utility. In the disability
context, for example, changing certain features of the social environment
(such as the pervasive use of stairs) could change the amount of marginal
utility that a person with a disability gets out of the marginal dollar.118
114

Shaviro, supra note 3, at 785.
See e.g., id. A utilitarian social welfare function would focus on marginal utility alone, in an effort to
wring the largest amount of utility out of each dollar. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 47, at 73. In contrast, if
society's distributive goals involve providing at least a threshold amount of well-being for each individual, people
who are less good at translating money into utility will need more resources to reach that threshold, and thus
might receive transfers whether their marginal utility is higher or lower than that of other people. See id.
(exploring this point in the context of people with disabilities).
116
Yet another consideration is that low willpower can manifest itself not only in choices between
consumption and savings but also in choices between leisure and labor. To the extent that low-willpower people
work less than high-willpower people, the existing tax system already offers them a break. Yet even if myopic
low-willpower people are more ready to substitute leisure for labor, other things equal, they might also find
themselves more frequently in binds (assuming imperfect liquidity) requiring work just for survival. It is even
possible that they would strategically engineer such binds to force themselves to work. See Peter Diamond &
Botond Köszegi, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1839, 1841, 1859 (2003)
(discussing such "strategic undersaving"). People with low willpower might also respond to their known
propensities by locking themselves into jobs that do not offer much flexibility. Finally, some low-willpower
people are hyperopic and would presumably be less ready to substitute leisure for labor.
117
Cf. Bankman and Weisbach, Reply, supra note 3, at 800-01 (making this point about low savings levels,
which might be indicative of myopia).
118
See Weisbach, supra note 47, at 65-66, 98 (discussing the social model of disability and the stairs
example, as well as the possibility that the latter may have public goods characteristics).
115
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Similarly, restructuring societal arrangements to make things easier on
those with low willpower could change the degree to which earned income
translates into utility for those individuals. Such arrangements might
include the in-kind distribution of tools (such as precommitment devices)
for better leveraging of utility, or a greater degree of intrapersonal
redistribution from the low-willpower person's low-marginal-utility states to
her high-marginal-utility states.119
In a different vein, John Roemer suggests an interesting way to dodge
moral hazard concerns while pursuing equality of opportunity: basing
distributive outcomes not on an individual's absolute level of effort, but
rather on how her effort ranks within the effort distribution that obtains for
her relevant comparison group.120 Thus, if Person A and Person B are
members of two different groups that exhibit different effort distributions,
and both A and B are in the 95th percentile in terms of effort for their
respective groups, then both would be deemed to have tried equally hard
under Roemer's theory and would be entitled to equal outcomes—even
though A's absolute level of effort might be lower or higher than B's.121
Whatever one may think of the proposal as a general approach to
distributive justice, there is an interesting "power equalization" feature at its
heart that has traction in combating moral hazard concerns: society rewards
individuals whose efforts exceed those of their reference group.122
Applying the idea to the present context, we might seek to direct
resources in a manner that benefits relatively high-willpower individuals
within low-willpower groups. If we did not have to worry about
"imitators"—high-willpower individuals who would try to slip into lowwillpower groups123—then such a plan would combine movement of
resources to low-willpower individuals with rewards for exerting willpower
effort. Significantly, however, rewarding willpower effort (even within
low-willpower groups) means placing at a relative disadvantage those who
exhibit less willpower. Thus, although I have included this approach under
the rubric of compensating for low willpower, it incorporates strains of a
quite opposite approach, to which I now turn.
B. Repricing Willpower Lapses
119
This analysis emphasizes a point that was glossed over in the earlier textual discussion about the
marginal utility of money for high- and low-willpower people, respectively: For a low-willpower person, the
marginal utility derived from a given dollar depends crucially on when it is received—how near or far from the
person's optimal point of consumption. See also Part IV.C.2 (discussing intrapersonal redistribution).
120
JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (1998).
121
Id. at 14-15.
122
As Roemer explains, the group as a whole might have less incentive to improve its distribution, but
because individual members within it have an incentive to rise to the top of the group, the distribution would be
expected to improve as well. Id. at 35.
123
See Weisbach, supra note 47, at 85-87 (discussing problem of "mimicking" in the disability context).
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Policymakers might respond to the fact that low-willpower people are
less well off than high-willpower people by attempting to (further) deter
people from willpower lapses. A system of rewards and penalties based on
how well people manage intertemporal dilemmas could lead to fewer lowwillpower types and more high-willpower types. Because "sin taxes" can be
characterized as a rough attempt to enact this idea, much of the analysis of
this approach will be taken up below in the course of discussing those
instruments.124 But some initial observations will help to highlight
considerations that apply to this approach even in the counterfactual case
where willpower levels are observable.125
One issue involves the possibility that penalties will fail to deter
willpower lapses. Individuals who do not stick to their OACPs are already
made worse off as a result. Since low-willpower people seem to be acting
irrationally—failing to do what is in their best interest—it is not clear how
responsive they will be to additional disincentives.126 Yet, sometimes the
problem with existing disincentives is not that they are too low, but rather
that they are temporally misplaced.127 Thus, policy instruments that move
penalties to the temporal point at which willpower must be applied, thus
raising the price of a lapse in currency that will not be discounted, could
offer fresh traction on intertemporal dilemmas.128
There is another problem, however. If low-willpower individuals do not
respond to the price change that the government has introduced, then they
will be made even worse off than before, relative to high-willpower
people.129 They must not only pay the new, higher price associated with the
willpower lapse (now) but also suffer the effects of the lapse in their own
lives (later). This result is difficult to justify on distributive grounds. Of
course, if certain kinds of willpower lapses produce especially large
externalities, shifting people away from them could make good policy sense
regardless of how they impact people’s own well-being.130 In that case,
however, the policy justification would lie in the externalities themselves,
124

See infra Part III.C
As discussed below, a central difficulty is in avoiding distorting the choices of people without willpower
problems. But even if we know an individual suffers from low willpower, there may still be difficulties in pricing
lapses appropriately.
126
Cf. DEMSETZ, supra note 90, at 25-26 (critiquing Robert Frank's suggestion of a progressive consumption
tax as an antidote to competitive consumption by asking "If the wealthy cannot discipline themselves to reduce
expenditures on luxury goods, why do they react sensibly to a tax-imposed increase in the cost of a unit of
stature?").
127
See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 91, at 189 (observing that future punishments or reward
designed to deter vice "are generally likely to be ineffective for the very reason that people succumb to vices in
the first place—because people tend to put disproportionate weight on costs and benefits that are immediate
relative to those that are delayed, and more generally have a hard time fully attending to future consequences").
128
Imposing a tax on the present self may be easier said than done, however. See Whitman & Rizzo, supra
note 35, at 428-29 (noting if a person subjected to a sin tax is able to borrow or has accumulated savings, a later
self can be made to pay the tax).
129
See id. at 190; Strnad, supra note 11, at 1254; text accompanying notes 193-196, infra.
130
See generally Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1651 (2009).
125
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not in concerns about willpower; the justification would apply with equal
force to decisions made by people who hold consistent preferences for the
externality-producing choice.
Finally, even if people do respond to governmentally engineered price
changes, the fact that willpower lapses may substitute for each other makes
the net effect unclear. Unless a policy mechanism can capture the entire
universe of lapses, additional willpower exertions in one realm may be
matched by additional or more severe lapses in another realm.131 For
example, penalizing people for a failure to save money might lead to better
savings habits but worse health habits.132 An even broader concern is raised
by the fact that willpower may draw on a general store of cognitive powers,
so that increasing the application of willpower may diminish effectiveness
in other decisional or attentional realms.133 For example, perhaps tightly
controlling certain aspects of discretionary consumption means paying less
attention to the details of one's mortgage or performing less effectively on
the job.
C. Closing the Willpower Gap
A third approach would seek to close the utility gap between highwillpower people and low-willpower people by blocking or mandating
particular choices.134 Our discussion above established that willpower can
only operate within the space that is left open by the framework of external
constraints. The tighter those constraints, the less willpower matters. A
complete ban on borrowing, or strict limits on consumption choices would
make self-control less relevant. Similarly, forced savings or mandatory
spending would constrain the available choice set. If applied across the
board to people who vary as to willpower but are otherwise identical, such
constraints would squeeze out some of the differences in well-being that
willpower presently generates. Indeed, intelligently formulated restrictions
could do more than that; to the extent they replicated what well-informed
people without willpower problems would choose, they could raise overall
well-being levels for low-willpower people without a corresponding drop in
well-being for high-willpower people.
Directly improving well-being by limiting choice has some advantages
over applying penalties to willpower shortfalls. Even if changing the prices
of lapses alters the extent to which they occur, the effort of engaging in self-

131
A recent paper examining the possibility that willpower exercised in one realm may leave less for use in
another realm is Ozdenoren et al., supra note 88.
132
See id. at 17-19 (modeling the case where willpower has alternative uses).
133
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
134
Mandatory retirement savings programs are a prominent real-world example. See infra Part III.D.
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control would remain.135 Not so if a choice is simply placed out of reach.136
An even more compelling advantage of placing choices out of reach is that
the individual will never be required to bear both the cost of the lapse itself
and an additional societal penalty.137 Moreover, unlike a transfer of funds to
people who exhibit low willpower, these direct well-being improvements do
not present an obvious moral hazard in inducing willpower reductions.
Nonetheless, the costs of limiting choice may be prohibitively high.
When applied to people without willpower problems, such constraints bite
into the ability to rearrange consumption without conferring offsetting
benefits. Even if constrained choice sets could be selectively applied to
those who struggle with self-control issues, information problems would
remain. Unless OACPs are fully observable, it would not be clear which
choices should be removed.138 Another concern is that a reduced choice set,
by eliminating the need to exert willpower, could weaken the development
or that trait.139 Whether or not we should worry about such a result depends
in part on whether we view the quality of willpower as something valuable
in itself for a culture to inculcate,140 or as merely instrumental to achieving
OACPs (and hence dispensable if OACPs can be achieved through other
means).
D. Taking Stock
Table 1 summarizes how the three basic approaches to willpower
heterogeneity surveyed above—directing resources toward low-willpower
individuals, penalizing willpower lapses, and forcing better choices—
interact with the three costs of self-control problems introduced earlier—
failure costs, exercise costs, and erosion costs. The entries in the table
135
Ian Ayres has suggested that “commitment contracts” under which people stand to lose significant
amounts of staked money would “take a future choice off the table” and thereby reduce the costs of exercising
self-control—although he acknowledges this is “pure speculation.” IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS 162
(2010). Because such contracts do not actually remove choice but instead only reprice lapses, it seems
questionable that they could entirely short-circuit the self-deliberation associated with exercising self-control.
However, perhaps very large potential forfeitures would lead people to create and heed bright-line rules that
would reduce exercise costs considerably. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
136
We would need to know, however, whether the deprivation itself produces any sort of depletion effect,
even aside from the exercise of willpower. See Fennell, supra note 13, at 99-100.
137
Note, however, that one response to this "double payment" problem would involve holding the fines in
trust for the individual's later self, or making the fines into a kind of forced insurance purchase. See Strnad, supra
note 11, at 1254. Thus, we can understand at least some "penalty" schemes as containing elements of forced
decisions. See text accompanying note 196 infra.
138
To the extent that people have access to their own OACPs (or some approximation), however, they might
provide input into the construction of the choice set, as through a voluntary precommitment mechanism.
Precommitment will be discussed further in Part IV.
139
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 29, at 32 ("[s]ocial security prevents the younger self from selling the older
self down the river, although at the same time it weakens the future-oriented self by reducing the benefits of
thrift")
140
See id. at 29-30 (noting potential cultural influences on "the relative strength of one's present-oriented and
future-oriented selves" and observing that public policies, such as those that tax particular choices or reallocate
resources intertemporally, affect the opportunity sets existing within a society).
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assume idealized, error-free applications of the strategies; later, I take up the
informational burdens that each approach entails, which raise the risk of
mistakes.
Table 1.

Strategies and Costs
Compensation

Failure Costs

lower per failure
but more failures
Exercise Costs lower in short run
Erosion Costs higher

Penalties/Subsidies Constricting
Choice
higher per failure
eliminated
but fewer failures
higher in short run eliminated
lower or negative
higher

First, consider the compensation strategy. Compensating for low
willpower reduces the cost of each failure; the stakes of doing a poor
intertemporal job are lessened through societal transfers. We might expect
the transfers to also reduce exercise costs; after all, people presumably only
exercise willpower to avoid failure, and the stakes of failure have now been
lowered. This looks like a cost savings. With exercise efforts reduced,
however, failures become likely, even if each is made less costly by societal
transfers.141 Hence, we would expect more failures, making the net effect on
failure costs ambiguous. Further, because buffering failure reduces the
marginal returns to willpower, there may be erosion costs associated with
willpower atrophy over time.
Penalizing willpower lapses takes exactly the opposite approach.142
Here, failure costs are amplified by the penalty itself, making failure even
more painful than before. One would expect people to react by increasing
their efforts to resist failure. This will increase exercise costs, but will also
presumably reduce failure costs. When failure does occur, however, it
produces a triple whammy: exercise costs, ordinary failure costs, and the
added penalty.143 Erosion costs are avoided; if anything, the increased
exercise of willpower induced by the penalty should help to build up
141
See Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1447 (suggesting that nontaxation of savings in
an effort to help myopic people would lead to an undoing of that help through further myopic behavior).
142
We can say the same of subsidizing willpower successes. Even though a subsidy sounds less punitive
than a tax, it still treats those who fail to engage in the preferred conduct worse in relative terms and hence
effectively penalizes their choices. On the general point that taxes and subsidies are flip sides of each other, see
Saul Levmore, Carrots and Torts, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 203 (Eric A. Posner ed.,
2000). A recent paper modeling the effects of savings subsidies in the presence of self-control problems is Per L.
Krusell et al., Temptation and Taxation March 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=519502. See also
Weiss, supra note 44, at 1298-99 (noting that a subsidy for savings could correct for a myopic discount rate).
143
In addition to governmental penalties, people often self-inflict nonpecuniary penalties like guilt and
regret, and might also be subject to shaming or stigma penalties from society or from their reference group. See,
e.g., Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 91; Glaeser, supra note 211, at 135. All of these penalties have the
same effect of increasing the costs of failure. When the deterrent does not work, people incur failure costs that
have been accordingly amplified.
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willpower over the longer run. Again, the overall effects on well-being are
uncertain; we would need to know how sensitive people are to penalties,
how expensive willpower is to exercise, and how likely it is to fail even
when exercised to the best of a person's ability.
The third approach, forcing particular choices, cleanly avoids both
exercise costs and failure costs. Returning to our transaction cost analysis,
it would be as if an omniscient judge simply awarded the entitlement to the
higher valuing user in a land use dispute, thus side-stepping the costs and
risks of relying on bargaining. Yet we might have concerns about erosion
costs, especially if the "judge" will not always be there to make the right
choice for our various selves. Moreover, failure costs and exercise costs
would continue to exact a higher price in utility from low-willpower people
in any sphere in which the forced choice did not operate.
The entries in Table 1 gloss over some additional costs that would be
present in any real-world willpower intervention. In particular, it is worth
considering the informational burdens presented by the various approaches.
Even if we could identify low-willpower people, this would not resolve
problems surrounding the determination of OACPs or the appropriate levels
at which to set any penalties or subsidies—and these determinations would
be essential to keeping error costs low under either a repricing or choice
elimination strategy. The strategy of compensating low-willpower people
requires little information beyond willpower levels, but presents heightened
incentive problems. Further, to the extent we cannot observe or find
workable proxies for willpower levels, we must worry not only about
people losing their willpower in fact, but also about people pretending to do
so.
III. WILLPOWER AND TAX IN THE REAL WORLD
The discussion above abstracted away from the identification problems
that beset efforts to address willpower in the real world. In this Part, I take
a different tack. Rather than ask in an idealized manner what society ought
to do about willpower heterogeneity, I ask what impacts, whether intended
or unintended, existing and proposed tax policy decisions might have on
people of varying willpower levels. As we will see, some approaches have
the effect of directing resources to low-willpower people, others have the
effect of penalizing willpower lapses, and still others operate by blocking or
forcing choices. I will also consider the role of "choice architecture" that
seeks to shape decisions without the use of force or of overt negative or
positive incentives.144
144
See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 11-13 (2008).
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A. Lifetime and Sublifetime Tax Periods
A perennial question in tax policy that has received significant recent
attention involves the length of the tax period.145 William Vickrey's
proposal of lifetime averaging would make the taxpayer's lifetime the
taxable period, with annual collections based on a running average.146
Variations on this theme, such as averaging over a shorter span of years,
have appeared in the literature,147 and some limited averaging provisions
have appeared in the tax code.148 Lengthening the tax period is often
recommended on grounds of horizontal equity. Within a progressive
system, people with fluctuating earnings will face higher marginal rates
during high earning years and lower marginal rates during low earning
years. The highs are not counterbalanced by the lows, however, and these
fluctuating earners are disadvantaged by the tax system relative to people
who earn the same aggregate amount in a steady pattern.149 If we believe
that both ability and ability to pay are more closely keyed to multiyear or
lifetime earnings than to annual earnings, longer tax periods seem sensible.
But using a longer tax period also means treating equivalently people
who earn in different patterns within that longer period. According to the
life-cycle hypothesis, different earning patterns should have no impact on
well-being, because people can simply rearrange money within the life
cycle to fund whatever consumption pattern is optimal. As we have seen,
matters are not quite so simple. Another way of framing the question of the
appropriate tax period is to ask whether all of the "selves" that make up an
individual's life should be considered part of the same taxable unit.150
When tax or benefit policies place family members or others into units,
what seems most important is the expectation that resources will be shared
among the members.151 If resources will in fact be shared between two
people, it is administratively wasteful to tax one of them only to make
redistributive payments to the other. More controversially, principles of
145
Shaviro, supra note 3; Fennell & Stark, supra note 5; Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income
Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2003); Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income
Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151 (2006); Liebman, supra note 4.
146
William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. ECON. 379 (1939).
147
See, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 145.
148
See, e.g., IRC § 1301 (permitting farming and fishing income to be spread over the preceding three
taxable years at the taxpayer’s election); former IRC §§ 1301-05, repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-514,§§ 141(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2117; see also Richard Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty
Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509 (describing and critiquing income
averaging provisions).
149
See Vickrey, supra note 146, at 379; Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 28 & tbl. 1.
150
See Zelenak, supra note 62, at 361-62.
151
See id. at 361 (observing that if economic identification or responsibility represents the principle upon
which taxable units are formed, "a similar argument could be made for treating a younger self and an older self as
a single tax equity unit, even if their status as separate persons is conceded").
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horizontal equity might be thought to constrain the degree to which two
resource-sharing units with the same total earnings should be treated
differently based on how their earnings are divided up among their
respective members.152
In exploring whether temporal selves should be grouped together for tax
purposes, then, we might want to examine how resource sharing works
among them.153 We want to know not only whether the selves are able to
share resources (i.e., free of external constraints on borrowing or saving),
but also whether they are willing to do so (a question of willpower). What
impact does the choice of tax period have on high-willpower and lowwillpower people, respectively? The answer turns out to be more
complicated than it might seem at first, and is best approached with an
example. Table 2 shows the wage earnings154 of four people, A, B, C, and D
over a four-year period, ignoring interest. As indicated in parentheses, A
and C are high-willpower individuals, whereas B and D are low-willpower
individuals. Assume that all four individuals have an OACP that would
involve perfect smoothing of consumption over the years, and that
borrowing is unavailable. Suppose further that the self-control problems
experienced by the low-willpower individuals, B and D, involve a kind of
"income inertia" such that income tends to be consumed very near the point
at which it is earned.

152
The desire to treat equal-earning couples equally clashes irreconcilably with the desire to treat equalearning individuals equally regardless of marital status, if a progressive tax rate schedule is in place. See, e.g.,
Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 147 (1998) ("marriage
neutrality, couples neutrality, and progressive rates are incompatible"). If members of a married couple "take
turns" as the primary breadwinner, then grouping their incomes together for tax purposes over short temporal
periods would have much the same effect as taxing each of them as individuals and lengthening the time period
over which tax liability is calculated. While it is unlikely that many households exhibit this precise pattern, it is
worth noting that grouping different people together may substitute in some degree for the grouping together of
different temporal selves.
153
The interaction between interpersonal and intrapersonal groupings would also require attention. It would
be technically challenging (at best) to continue with the policy of grouping together different people into taxable
units while also attempting to group together different temporal selves, given that people do not stay in the same
household configurations throughout their lifetimes. See Zelenak, supra note 62, at 356 (discussing Vickrey's
recognition of and approach to this problem in the context of his lifetime averaging proposal).
154
Saving and investment income is ignored in this simple example.
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Table 2: Four Earners
A (high
willpower)
B (low
willpower)
C (high
willpower)
D (low
willpower)

Year 1
10

Year 2
10

Year 3
10

Year 4
10

Total
40

10

10

10

10

40

20

0

20

0

40

20

0

20

0

40

A tax that is based on the entire period would treat all four individuals
equally. But are they equally well off? Taxpayers A and B are in exactly
the same position on both an annual and whole-period basis; they would be
taxed equivalently regardless of which of these tax periods is chosen.
Taxpayer A would have the ability to rearrange her income into a different
consumption pattern, but because her earnings happen to fall into the same
pattern as her OACP, she need not do so. Taxpayer B’s low willpower
renders him unable to rearrange his earnings into a better consumption
pattern, but again, this does not matter because his earning pattern happens
to match up with his OACP.
What about C and D? C can easily (and we will assume, costlessly)
rearrange her earnings to match her OACP. Despite her fluctuating earning
pattern, she is, in terms of consumption possibilities, in exactly the same
position as A and B. D, however, lacks the willpower necessary to
rearrange his earnings to match his OACP. His earnings "stick" and are
consumed where they fall, which, unhappily, does not turn out to be his
optimal pattern. Consider now how the choice of tax period affects the four
individuals. Annual taxation would treat A and B (steady earners) better
than C and D (uneven earners) within a progressive tax system. That would
mean treating C, who is relevantly like A and B, differently. Whole-period
taxation would treat all four alike. This would remove the artificial
distinction that the annual tax system draws between A and B on the one
hand, and C on the other, but it would also sweep D, who seems to be
relevantly different, into the same tax category. We might think that D
would prefer this; it would mean his fluctuating earnings are taxed the same
way as the steady earnings of A and B. The annual tax period taxed his
fluctuating earnings more heavily, and we might think that the last thing D
needs is a heavier tax burden.
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But the story is not so clear-cut. The tax system does not just
redistribute among different people, it also redistributes intrapersonally
through the life cycle. At times, it does this in very obvious ways (as
through payroll taxes and Social Security benefits). Less recognized is the
fact that the application of progressive rates to annual periods throughout
the life cycle moves money from higher income selves to lower income
selves.155 An annual tax system thus places one's current self in the same
distributive relationship with one's own poorer and richer selves as with all
poorer and richer (temporal versions of) other people.156 And D may need
redistribution from his other selves even more than he needs a tax break. C,
however, can do just fine without intrapersonal redistribution. Under an
annual tax system, C would cross-subsidize the tax system's regularization
of D's income by being part of the pool of fluctuating earners to whom
higher tax rates are applied.
Of course, earning patterns are not necessarily exogenous. Another way
of looking at the story is to suppose that taxing fluctuating earners more
heavily will induce more people to become regular earners. This is usually
viewed as a distortion, and another reason for favoring lifetime taxation.157
But if many people struggle with self-control problems, further inducing
them to take up earning patterns that are likely to more closely match their
OACPs could be valuable. The lifetime tax period would not have that
effect, although it might still encourage people to develop more willpower.
D in our story could improve his situation by being more like C under a
lifetime system, or by being more like B under an annual system. Which
move is the more achievable goal for people with self-control problems may
bear on our choice of tax periods.
There are many additional issues that I can only touch on briefly here.
First, not all self-control problems take the form I have posited of income
inertia. It is also possible for people to act hyperopically and push
consumption too far away from the point at which money is earned. Second,
not everyone wants to smooth out their consumption. If people wish to pile
up consumption into heaps and alternate them with periods of low
consumption, for example, then D's willpower problems would interfere
less with that OACP than would B's. Third, borrowing adds new wrinkles,
both by opening up additional vistas for self-control problems and by
making it possible for people to smooth consumption backwards. Yet the
example helpfully emphasizes the potential role of intrapersonal
155
For discussion of this point, see, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 229-33; Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at
42-45. This assumes that taxes are used to provide goods and services that are spread among the community on
some basis other than the amount of current-year taxes paid. See Zelenak, supra note 62, at 368 n.165.
156
The textual statement assumes the same structure of tax rates persists over time, which will not
necessarily be the case. In this respect, at least, the current self's distributive relationship with its contemporaries
may differ from that which it enjoys with past and future selves (whether one's own, or those of others).
157
See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 767; Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 32-33.
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redistribution within an annual tax system. It would be possible to do even
more intrapersonal redistribution through the tax system by employing
mechanisms like age-based taxation,158 or by simply altering the timing of
tax collection.159 I will consider below the possibility of allowing people
opt into particular tax timing regimes based, among other things, on their
preferences for intrapersonal redistribution.160
B. Income Taxes and Consumption Taxes
Closely allied conceptually to the question of the appropriate tax period
is the question of whether an income or a consumption tax should be
used.161 If we take the lessons of the life-cycle hypothesis to heart, an
optimal tax system would leave individuals free to arrange both labor and
consumption in any temporal pattern they choose.162 Just as annual taxation
can distort earning patterns, taxing savings—which an income tax does, but
a consumption tax, at least in its "prepaid" form, does not—can distort
consumption patterns.163 In addition, the results are often deemed unfair to
savers.164
If we were to simply eliminate the tax on all savings without changing
anything else, the tax system would become less progressive, assuming
people with high labor incomes save more than people with low labor
incomes.165 But, as proponents of the consumption tax have emphasized,
158

See Polinsky, supra note 5, at 150; Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 47-49.
See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 249 (discussing the possibility that households could defer tax
payments without changing the present value tax liability); Shaviro, supra note 3, at 761-62 (distinguishing annual
tax liability from annual cash flow settlement); Fennell & Stark, supra note 5, at 58-63 (discussing the potential
for altering collection protocols).
160
See infra Part IV.C.3.
161
See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 748-49; see also Zelenak, supra note 62, at 333, 351-54.
162
See Shaviro, supra note 3, at 788 (noting the implications of the permanent income hypothesis for the
choice of tax base as well as for the choice of tax period).
163
On this account, choices about when to consume are no different than choices between different goods.
See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 765 (analyzing “earlier consumption” and “later consumption” as two goods);
Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1423-27 (analogizing the choice to one between prunes and
figs). Like any other tax that applies different rates to different commodities, a tax on savings adds a distortion to
the labor-leisure distortion that already exists. See A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure:
Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1976); Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at
1414-19. The conclusion that the results are unambiguously less efficient is based on the assumption that the new
distortion to consumption timing piles on top of, without in any way alleviating, the original labor-leisure
distortion. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 3, at 783. This assumption is based, in turn, on the claim that a tax on
savings distorts labor just as much as a wage tax. See Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1422
(asserting that a tax on income from savings "distorts work effort in exactly the same manner as if the work had
been taxed directly"). If people are myopic, this assumption might not hold true; the deferred tax on savings would
have less of an impact on labor than would the immediate wage tax. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 5, at 2
(observing that "taxes on capital – or, equivalently, differential taxes on future consumption – are ordinarily levied
in the future, raising the possibility that they may have less of an effect on the current labor supply of myopic
individuals").
164
For a discussion of this argument and the sort of example used to make it, as well as a counterargument,
see Kelman, supra note 7, at 653-58.
165
In other words, savings might be characterized as a “luxury good” that is predominantly available to the
wealthy. See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1428; Christopher D. Carroll, Why Do the
159
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the change could be made distributively neutral by making the tax on labor
income more progressive, so that each wage class continues to bear the
same relative burden as under a system in which savings as well as earnings
were taxed.166 The distributive effects would be different within wage
classes than they are presently, but the system as a whole would not have to
become less progressive between wage classes.167 If it were possible to
undertake such a distributively neutral shift,168 how would high- and lowwillpower people, respectively, fare?
If we think that wage levels are positively correlated with willpower
levels, then a progressive rate structure would already (on average) deliver
relief to low-willpower groups. Not taxing savings would then reward (or
at least not punish) those relatively high-willpower individuals within lowwillpower groups, much like Roemer's notion of rewarding effort that is
relatively high within a given reference group.169 Such an approach would
have the attractive characteristic of not deterring individuals from exerting
willpower effort while at the same time directing more resources (through
the progressive rate structure) to those in low-willpower groups. The
argument depends, however, on the empirical assumption that willpower
levels correlate with wage levels. There is some evidence that impatience is
inversely related to cognitive ability,170 which in turn would be expected to
correlate with wage income. While impatience is not the same thing as low
willpower, low willpower is one reason that impatient behaviors may at
times be observed.171 But there is also significant heterogeneity in savings
behaviors within wage income levels, which might at least be suggestive of
willpower heterogeneity.
Would wealth levels (at a given wage level and life stage) offer a better
Rich Save So Much?, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? 465, 481(Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
166
See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, Superiority, supra note 3, at 1428-30. Indeed, efficiency gains from the
system might be used to underwrite a more progressive tax system than the one we have currently. See id.
167
See id. at 1439-40 (explaining that switching to a "replicating wage tax" from an income tax "will
redistribute from spenders to savers" within wage classes).
168
Maintaining distributive neutrality while eliminating a tax on savings would require placing a higher tax
rate on a narrower base, a move that might well prove politically impossible. Cognitive work suggests that how a
tax burden is presented and framed determines how it is evaluated. See, e.g., Jonathan Baron & Edward J.
McCaffery, Masking Redistribution (or Its Absence), in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 85 (Edward J. McCaffery
& Joel Slemrod, eds., 2006).
169
See text accompanying notes 120-123, supra.
170
See Thomas Dohmen, et al., Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability? 100 AM
ECON. REV. 1238, 1257 (2010) (finding, based on tests administered to a sample of over 1,000 people age 17 and
older living in Germany, "that people with lower cognitive ability are ... significantly more impatient" after
"controlling for personal characteristics, educational attainment, income, and liquidity constraints"). An earlier
study of 92 Chilean high school students generated similar results. See Daniel J. Benjamin et al., Who Is
"Behavioral"? Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences, Working Paper (2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=675264.
171
See text accompanying note 33 supra (defining willpower and distinguishing it from stable time
preferences). For another take on the connection between intelligence and self-control, see Posner, supra note 29,
at 28-29 (observing that "as imagination is a component of intelligence, a more intelligent person will be more
future-oriented than will a less intelligent one" but also noting a countervailing factor—the intelligent person's
ability to "develop rationalizations that may deceive the future-oriented self").

29-Oct-10]

WILLPOWER TAXES

35

gauge of willpower levels? Presumably, the relationship between wealth
accumulation and willpower is nonrandom, and there is some empirical
evidence connecting the two.172 The contours of the relationship are not
entirely straightforward, however. For one thing, self-control problems can
manifest in both oversaving and undersaving.173 Consumption timing
preferences (as distinct from willpower) can explain some differentials in
savings behavior, as can differences in earning patterns and in inherited
wealth. Nonetheless, the relative accumulation of wealth at any given
income level and life-cycle stage offers at least a weak informational signal
about willpower. However, this information might be taken into account in
ways other than an income on savings and investments.174
Thus far, I have been using as my model for the consumption tax what
is sometimes termed the "prepaid" version, which simply taxes labor
income and does not tax any savings or investment income. Operating on
the premise that earned income will be consumed sooner or later, such a tax
collects upfront for the consumption that will inevitably follow, without
regard to when consumption actually occurs. Another possibility is a
"postpaid" consumption tax under which tax liability for a given period is
based on actual consumption within that period. If a postpaid system were
made progressive, as Edward McCaffery has advocated,175 it would have
some interesting implications for willpower analysis. McCaffery views
savings used for consumption smoothing as legitimately nontaxable, but
advocates taxing savings that enable consumption above this "smoothing"
baseline.176 He bases his normative case for this approach primarily on its
heavier taxation of those whose consumption horizons are expanded by
172
See, e.g., John Ameriks et al., Wealth Accumulation and the Propensity to Plan, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1007,
1039 (2003) (finding a correlation between planning behaviors and wealth accumulation based on survey and
accounting data collected from TIAA-CREF participants and positing that "effortful self-control" may be
involved); Ameriks, et al., supra note 23 (in a study involving the hypothetical allocation of ten "dream restaurant
night[s]" over two years by a sample of TIAA-CREF participants, finding results that "suggest[] that the average
overconsumer accumulates some 20 percent less than one with no self-control problem, while the average
underconsumer accumulates some 25 percent more"). For an interesting complication, see Ozdenoren et al, supra
note 88, at 10 (suggesting that poverty may cause impatience).
173
See Ameriks, supra note 172; see also Rick et al., supra note 18. Not only may people oversave due to
miserliness, they may also do so as a result of excessive rule-following prompted by their own propensities to
undersave. See text accompanying notes 75-77, supra.
174
Bankman and Weisbach have noted that even if some marginal tax on savings were supported by the
"indicator good" argument, there is no particular reason to think that applying the same marginal tax to savings as
to labor income would be warranted. Bankman & Weisbach, Reply, supra note 3, at 801; see also Deborah Weiss,
Can Capital Tax Policy Be Fair? Stimulating Savings Through Differentiated Tax Rates, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
206, 228-29 (discussing separate tax schedules for capital and wage income, as well as the possibility of separate
capital tax schedules applicable to different wage groups). Another alternative would be a periodic wealth tax,
which has sometimes been discussed as a possible adjunct to a consumption tax. See, e.g., John K. McNulty,
Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy
Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2182 (2000) ((citing the Meade Report, J.E.
MEADE, INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (1978)). In Part
IV.C.4, I will consider another possible way to incorporate information about wealth accumulation into a tax
system.
175
Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807 (2005).
176
Id. at 815-16.
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what is, to them, a windfall, as where one generation is able to consume at a
much higher level than their earnings would otherwise permit, due to the
savings and bequests of the prior generation.177 But it would have the
additional effect of encouraging people to smooth their own consumption
through the life cycle—a feature that McCaffery also views as attractive.178
Notice that in this regard a progressive postpaid tax would present the
flip side of the horizontal equity concerns that Vickrey raised about annual
taxation. Instead of taxing more heavily those who earn unevenly, as
annual taxation does, McCaffery's proposal would tax more heavily those
who spend unevenly. The progressive rate structure effectively penalizes
consumption that occurs in large lumps; the lower marginal rate applied to
the valleys between these lumps will not counterbalance the tax effects of
these spending spikes. Thus, the rate structure rewards smooth consumption
(although McCaffery proposes brackets wide enough that the smoothing
need not be perfect to reap those rewards).179 Because such a tax system
favors one consumption pattern over another, it would be expected to
produce distortions in the direction of that pattern. Of course, if one
believes that the smooth consumption pattern is normatively superior,180
these shifts would be viewed not as distortions but rather as desirable
corrections.
Can we view the postpaid progressive consumption tax as an example of
penalizing low willpower in an effort to produce higher willpower?
Clearly, low-willpower people would be less able to conform their
consumption to a specified pattern than would high-willpower people,
assuming that the two groups do not systematically vary with respect to
how closely their earning patterns already approximate it (or along other
relevant dimensions such as access to capital). The distributive results
would be unattractive to the extent that low-willpower people failed to
achieve the requisite degree of smoothing and suffered from higher tax
burdens as a result. Would there be a countervailing benefit for those
members of the low-willpower population who responded to the incentive
and engaged in a greater degree of consumption smoothing? Perhaps, but
we would need to know more.
As I have emphasized already, we do not know what the (pre-tax)
OACP of any particular person or group of people looks like, so it is
difficult to infer whether observed uneven consumption is a product of low
willpower, mere preferences, or other constraints.181 If OACPs typically
177

Id. at 870.
Id. at 882-84.
179
Id. at 882-83; see also id. at 874 tbl 2.
180
McCaffery takes this view. See id. at 884 ("It is prudent and good to live within one's means, to borrow
sensibly in youth and to save responsibly in middle age.").
181
The tax system is one input into the calculation that determines what someone's OACP is, and heavily
taxing uneven consumption could therefore turn smooth consumption into one's OACP where it would not have
178
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involve very smooth consumption, then penalizing uneven consumption
might encourage many people to do a better job of achieving their OACPs.
But where OACPs involve lumpy, uneven consumption, penalizing that
uneven consumption would introduce a deadweight loss: people with
lumpy OACPs who switched to a smooth pattern would suffer diminished
utility without delivering any revenue to the tax system.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the approach that is embodied in
McCaffery's proposal has a venerable history. The postpaid progressive
consumption tax aspires to operate as a welfare enhancing Pigouvian tax on
certain kinds of consumption choices that are thought to be harmful to
society or to the people making them. We see this same approach in a
broad range of taxes and subsidies for activities that are disfavored or
favored on normative grounds.
C. Sin Taxes (or Virtue Subsidies)
While we usually think that taxes work better the less they distort
behavior, some taxes (and subsidies)182 intentionally reprice behavior in the
hope of aligning it more closely with the social optimum. Pigouvian taxes
are designed to correct for externalities—costs that would not otherwise be
taken into account in the decisionmaker's calculus.183 In a world of zero
transaction costs, the opportunities for bargaining would cause every cost to
be taken into account.184 In many real-world contexts, however, external
costs are unlikely to be internalized by the parties imposing them. The same
principle can be applied in the case of internalities, or costs that one
temporal self imposes on other selves.185
Translating Pigouvian taxes designed for externalities into the
intrapersonal context presents a problem, however: it will typically be
much less clear that an unaccounted for cost has actually been imposed on
been such before. Because we want to examine whether some other consumption pattern would have delivered
more lifetime utility in the absence of the behavioral influence of the tax, we are interested in people's pre-tax
OACPs in the context of the present discussion.
182
The two tools mirror each other. Although I will focus on the taxes, there may be instances where a
subsidy would be preferred. For analysis of these alternatives, see generally Levmore, supra note 142.
183
Pigou advocated taxes or subsidies to close the gap between the private and social payoffs of an act. A.C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1962) [1932]. Thus, the actor would be taxed in an amount
equal to the marginal cost of the external harm inflicted (or receive a subsidy equal to the marginal external
benefits provided). See, e.g., Maureen L. Cropper and Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30
J. ECON. LIT. 675, 680 (1992) (defining Pigouvian taxes).
184
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For this reason, a cost imposed on
another party is not necessarily an externality. We must examine whether the actor took the impacts in question
into account, as by agreeing to pay for the costs or refusing a payment to cease. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL.
PROPERTY 44 (6th ed. 2006).
185
See, e.g., R.J. Herrnstein, et al., Utility Maximization and Melioration: Internalities in Individual Choice,
6 J. BEHAV. DECISION-MAKING 149, 150 (1993) (defining "'internality'" as "a within-person externality"); Ted
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825 (2006) (applying Pigouvian analysis to
internalities). Willpower lapses are only one possible source of internalities; selves may impose costs on other
selves without even realizing that they are doing so. See, e.g., Herrnstein et al, supra, at 154.
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another party.186 The question is not whether a given temporal self causes
another self to suffer some observable harm, but rather whether the acting
self did so without taking into account the impact on the later self. To know
whether this is the case, we need some idea of the transaction cost
environment surrounding the individual's internal deliberations.187 One
might reasonably argue that some individuals approach a Coasean state in
which different temporal selves frictionlessly transact.188 This assumption is
indeed implicit in the life-cycle model. People who are consistently capable
of making perfect intertemporal tradeoffs are no doubt the exception, but
many people do regularly take the effects on other selves into account in
their decisionmaking. For example, someone may choose to eat a bowl of
ice cream fully recognizing and accepting the likely impact on her weight
and health.189 If the current self is already internalizing all the costs of the
decision, a tax generates rather than corrects a distortion.190 A heavy tax on
ice cream might induce a shift to, say, chewing gum, producing a reduction
in the person's lifetime well-being and raising no revenue for the
government—a deadweight loss.
Some additional concerns about repricing conduct have already been
raised above.191 Not only may a tax fail to properly match the impacts of the
conduct in question, especially when nonlinearities are present,192 it
imposes especially heavy burdens on those with the lowest stocks of
willpower by adding a external penalty to the costs of willpower failure.193
If the tax is accurately set to match the damage that the activity does to a
186
See Whitman, supra note 57, at 1 (criticizing current versions of internality theory for "ignor[ing] the
possibility of within-person bargaining and other private solutions to self-control problems").
187
On this question, and the difficulty of getting good information about it, see Ainslie, supra note 94, at
139, 166-70; see also Whitman, supra note 57, at 6-13 (analyzing intrapersonal bargaining opportunities and
potential breakdowns in them).
188
On the other hand, the inability to enter into binding contracts with one's other selves arguably makes the
transaction cost environment less accommodating than in the interpersonal case. See Whitman, supra note 57, at
9-10 (noting this and other differences between the transaction cost problems faced by different selves and
different people).
189
See id. at 11 (discussing an example in which the choice to eat a Twinkie is fully internalized). To be
sure, full internalization of this sort confronts some difficulties, including the fact that future impacts tend to be
intangible. See Scott Rick & George Loewenstein, Intangibility in Intertemporal Choice (2008), available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082056. Delayed effects are also typically uncertain, and frequently depend on
complex interactions with other decisions that are difficult to predict. See, e.g., id.; Drazen Prelec & R.J.
Herrnstein, Preferences or Principles: Alternative Guidelines for Choice, in STRATEGY AND CHOICE 319, 322-24
(Richard J. Zeckhauser, ed., 1991) (describing "temporal mismatch," "saliency mismatch," and "scale mismatch,"
all of which can interfere with individuals' efforts to pursue their long-run objectives).
190
See, e.g., Whitman supra note 57, at 11.
191
See supra Part II.B.
192
See, e.g., Strnad, supra note 11, at 1244 (discussing complexities associated with nonlinear impacts). To
be sure, the same problem with nonlinearity exists when taxes attempt to correct for externalities. However,
measurement difficulties may be especially acute for internalities.
193
See id. at 1254; cf. Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 91, at 183 (explaining that when negative
emotions associated with giving into temptation fail to prevent the lapse, "people, in effect, pay twice for their
indulgences: they incur the material negative consequences that result, and they also experience negative emotions
as a result of their lapse"); id. at 190 (explaining that "interventions [that] involve manipulating immediate
emotions such as guilt and fear . . . run into exactly the same problems as do the self-control strategies under
discussion: when they don't succeed in altering behavior, they merely impose additional costs on people").
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future self, then those who choose to pay and continue suffer twice as much
harm as they would in the absence of the tax.194 One way around this
difficulty is to let the later self receive the tax proceeds collected from the
earlier self; the money will then compensate her for her earlier self's bad
decisions.195 Where the actions of the earlier self produce a risk of harm
rather than a certainty, we might treat the tax payments as insurance
premiums that go toward treating the problems that the later self may
develop.196
At this point, we can reframe the policy intervention as a forced
purchase of insurance bundled with the good in question, or as a withdrawal
of a previously available choice (buying Good X on its own). The idea of
withdrawing choices outright is well-represented among implemented and
proposed policies, as the next section explains.
D. Forced and Forbidden Intertemporal Choices
Social Security offers a good example of a mandated intertemporal
tradeoff, and its interactions with myopic decisionmaking have received
significant attention.197 While forcing people to allocate money to later
periods might be justified on a number of grounds, including control of the
externalities from widespread poverty among the elderly, some of the
advantages relate directly to self-control. Placing hard constraints on choice
sets offers a way around the costs associated with low willpower. Not only
does such an approach keep people from making unfortunate intertemporal
tradeoffs through a lapse of willpower, it also avoids the less dramatic
problem of people burning up limited cognitive resources in refraining from
such a lapse.198 Thus, Social Security produces results that might resemble
194
Strnad supra note 11, at 1254. As noted above, it might actually be a "triple-whammy" if exercise costs
are unsuccessfully incurred as well. See text accompanying note 143, supra. Guilt and other nonpecuniary
penalties could raise the cost even higher. See Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 91, at 183.
195
See Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 59. This requires, of course, that the earlier self actually bear
the burden of the tax—which may not be the case if borrowing or savings are available. See Whitman & Rizzo,
supra note 35, at 428-29.
196
See Strnad, supra note 11, at 1255.
197
See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 44, at 1298-99; Feldstein, supra note 5; Kaplow, supra note 5; Kumru &
Thanopoulos, supra note 5; Helmuth Cremer, et al., Forced Saving, Redistribution, and Nonlinear Social Security
Schemes, CESifo Working Paper No. 2325 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1145182; Ayşe
İmrohoroğlu, et al., Time-inconsistent Preferences and Social Security, 118 Q.J. OF ECON. 745 (2003); Diamond
& Köszegi, supra note 108; LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 291-301
(2008). Social Security embodies just one possible design approach to a mandatory retirement savings program.
See Blog Posting of Dan Ariely, http://danariely.com/2010/09/25/want-people-to-save-force-them/ (Sept. 25,
2010) (discussing Chile’s legally mandated retirement savings program, in which 11% of salary must be
channeled to a retirement account, but employees retain some choice as to the risk level).
198
The idea that exercising self-control is costly is often explicitly included in economic models of
intertemporal choice. See, e.g., Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Temptation and Self-Control, 69
ECONOMETRICA 1403, 1420 (2001) ("utility penalty" from the exercise of self control); Shefrin & Thaler supra
note 49, at 612 ("psychic cost" of willpower); Ozdenoren et al., supra note 88 (modeling the depletion effects of
exercising willpower).
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those brought about by willpower without any exertion of self-control,
saving people the costs of avoiding temptation.199
A variety of other policies similarly operate to foreclose particular
choices or to remove particular products from the market. Regulatory
controls on prices200 and on product attributes withdraw choices or buffer
their negative effects.201 These restrictions could have the effect of
allocating more surplus to the consumer, or they might simply drive away
suppliers in ways that remove options from the consumer's choice set.
Consider, for example, tighter limits on mortgage lending. If regulatory
limits placed certain kinds of loans out of reach, people need not exert
willpower to keep themselves from taking on that type of debt; the priceproduct bundle is unavailable. As in the case of Social Security, this choice
withdrawal has two potential benefits. First, it means that people will not
make certain kinds of borrowing choices. Second, it means that people will
not waste the cognitive energy that it takes to resist those borrowing
choices.
These advantages come with some significant downsides, however.
First, the "energy savings" benefit might not prove advantageous over the
long run, if taking too many decisions away from individuals causes
willpower to atrophy over time.202 Given how little we know about the
precise operation of willpower, we cannot be sure whether the short run
conservation advantages of avoiding the exertion of willpower will outstrip
the long-run "strength training" advantages of regularly making such
exertions. Second, blocking decisions obviously impedes autonomy—
including that of high-willpower people who do not want or need to have
the choice taken from them. Indeed, the blocked choice may be an integral
part of the OACPs of many people, and while blocking it off may help
certain low-willpower individuals achieve their OACPs, that gain comes at
the cost of thwarting the ability of higher willpower people to pursue their
OACPs.203
199
See Kumru & Thanopoulos, supra note 5, at 774-75 (noting the effects of Social Security in reducing the
costs of exercising willpower, as well as the possibility that it could reduce self-control efforts among the young).
200
It is worth noting that limits on prices, such as interest rate caps on consumer loans, take exactly the
opposite approach of an intrapersonal Pigouvian tax. Rather than aim to reduce the harm caused by an activity by
raising its price (and thus deterring participation), such reforms try to reduce the harm caused by an activity by
lowering its price, even though this move would also be expected to increase demand. See, e.g., Richard Posner,
Becker-Posner Blog, Have We Lost the Moral Values That Undergird a Commercial Society? June 15, 2008
(critiquing an argument by David Brooks in favor of increased lending by churches and foundations by observing
that if the loans are made available "at lower interest rates than payday loans, the former payday borrowers will
borrow more").
201
Bans on certain product attributes might also be recast as repricings. For example, tar and nicotine levels
might be regulated or alcohol content limited in an effort to protect consumers. Because consumers can counter
the restriction by consuming more of the product, a possible effect is simply to raise the cost of consumption, as
with a sin tax.
202
See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing “erosion costs”).
203
For a general critique of libertarian paternalism based on its tendency to burden more rational individuals
in order to provide benefits to those who are less rational, see Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an
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E. Sticky Defaults
An in-kind form of repricing that tries to overcome the difficulties
associated with withdrawing choices outright is the notion of “nudging”
through default selections.204 In the realm of intertemporal choice, such
nudges generally amount to making the more patient or farsighted choice
the default. The Obama administration has embraced this approach in the
context of retirement planning,205 following research that shows how
automatic participation in 401(k) programs can keep procrastination from
eroding the potential savings of employees.206 Such default selections
aspire to an "asymmetric paternalism" that helps those who need it without
imposing large costs on those who do not.207 While advocates of such
policies recognize that opting out does impose a cost, they suggest that
expenditures can be kept to a minimum, as with Thaler and Sunstein's "oneclick paternalism."208 Moreover, in cases where it is impossible to avoid
having some default,209 there will inevitably be costs associated with opting
out.
The usual reason for advocating a small nudge (an easy opt-out
procedure) over a forceful shove (a more difficult procedure for opting out)
is to avoid imposing costs on those who rationally disprefer the default. But
in deciding how sticky to make a given default, we should worry not only
about people who rationally choose to opt out, but also about those who
irrationally opt out. Like a tax or subsidy, a default alters the relative prices
of making a particular choice, but the differential is collected in hassle and
Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1269-75 (2005).
204
See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 144.
205
See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Savings Accounts for All: Simple, but Not Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009
(discussing the president’s proposal, which would require employers to direct deposit a portion of workers’
earnings into an IRA unless the worker opts out). Additional applications might include default selections
designed to foster more annuitization. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, The Unloved Annuity Gets a Hug from Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010 (referencing William Gale et al., Increasing Annuitization of 401(k) Plans with Automatic
Trial Income, Brookings Retirement Security Project, No. 2008-2 (June 2008), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/06_annuities_gale/06_annuities_gale.pdf).
206
See, e.g., James Choi et al., Passive Decisions and Potent Defaults, in ANALYSES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
AGING 59 (David Wise, ed., 2005) (modeling impacts of 401(k) defaults); James Choi et al., For Better or for
Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior in PERSPECTIVES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 83
(David Wise, ed., 2004) (finding in a study of three large firms "that automatic enrollment has a dramatic impact
on participation rates" leading to enrollments in excess of 85 percent, whereas previous enrollments at those firms
"ranged from 26 to 43 percent after six months of tenure ... and from 57 to 69 percent after three years of tenure").
207
See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for
"Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2003) (."A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic
if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully
rational."); see also Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in
BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 125, 150 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999) (presenting the
equivalent concept of "cautious paternalism").
208
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 248-49.
209
To take one of Thaler and Sunstein's examples, cafeteria designers must put food in some order; they
might therefore consciously select an arrangement that encourages patrons to make healthier selections. THALER
& SUNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 1-6; see also id. at 86 (noting the potential for “required choice” approaches in
some contexts).
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effort, rather than in dollars. Just as people may make an undesirable
temporal choice under a regime in which those choices are taxed, people
may opt out even when they shouldn't. An unheeded sin tax makes the
"sinner" worse off than before (enduring both the bad results of the habit
and the tax);210 similarly, an unheeded nudge leaves the opter-out worse off
than before (enduring both the hassle of opting out and the bad results of the
choice). However, in the sin tax context the money collected could, at least
in theory, go toward easing the plight of the later selves (as by using
cigarette tax revenues to fund the treatment of lung cancer). The costs of
opting out are simply lost.211
A default's impact is only partly a function of inertia, however; some of
the default's effects flow from conveying information or advice about what
is best in the long run.212 In this respect, the default choice resembles other
efforts to educate decisionmakers.213 Such approaches are largely
orthogonal to the question of willpower (which assumes knowledge of a
better long-term plan than the current self wishes to undertake).214 But
educational efforts could produce a culture in which certain kinds of
consumption and savings patterns receive higher levels of approval and
status, and this could potentially influence the development and deployment
of willpower. More interestingly, some instruments for imparting financial
advice, such as financial planning software, might also offer platforms from
which precommitments could be undertaken.
IV. SELF-SORTING TOWARD SELF-CONTROL
As the discussion to this point has suggested, informational burdens
make addressing willpower heterogeneity very difficult. In this last part, I
will consider the potential to lower informational burdens by inducing selfselection. After considering the government's potential role in offering
precommitment devices, I will consider an approach that relies on selfsorting into tax and regulatory regimes designed to be differentially
attractive to high-willpower and low-willpower populations.
A. Precommitment Strategies

210

See Strnad supra note 11, at 1254.
Cf. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (2006) (observing that the
"psychic tax" that soft paternalism imposes through stigmatizing certain behaviors "provides no revenue") (citing
Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 91, at 190).
212
See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 206, at 70 (discussing defaults as providing “implicit advice”); THALER
& SUNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 35, 83.
213
For example, the question of financial literacy education has recently attracted a great deal of attention.
For a skeptical view, see Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197 (2008).
214
See id. at 239-40 (distinguishing self-control efforts from education).
211
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The potential role of precommitment in managing self-control problems
is well known and has been thoroughly and interestingly discussed in the
literature.215 Given the way I have defined willpower shortfalls here (as
distinct from persistent time preferences or unexpected and unregretted
preference reversals), precommitment will nearly always be at least a
theoretical possibility. Precommitment avoids two primary problems that
generally accompany societal attempts to address self-control issues. First,
because precommitment is always self-imposed, autonomy concerns are
lessened. They are not, however, eliminated—we still must decide when a
particular self is entitled to make decisions that are binding on other selves,
and under what conditions those later selves can undo things.216 Second,
precommitment relies on the self-identification of those with low willpower
and hence avoids problems of overbroad application of a policy that bans or
reprices particular alternatives. Precommitment can also be tailored in a
variety of ways, either to foreclose future choices or to price them.217
A threshold question for tax policy is whether governmental
precommitment mechanisms are necessary. Some private precommitment
devices exist, of course. People can avail themselves of self-exclusion
policies offered by casinos,218 use financial products that embed illiquidity
or constrain consumption,219 pour their money into relatively illiquid
repositories like houses,220 make purchase decisions in ways that
intentionally ration access to “vice” goods,221 and even enter into
agreements to forfeit money if they break their promises to themselves.222
215
See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 PUBLIC INTEREST 94 (1980);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83
(1984); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 29–34 (2000); AINSLIE, supra note 75, at 125-44; BARON, supra note
16, at 480-81. An unmet demand for commitment features prominently in many economic models of self-control
problems. See, e.g., Laibson, supra note 23; Kaplow, supra note 5, at 4-5; İmrohoroğlu, et al., supra note 197.
216
See text accompanying notes 57-60, supra.
217
See text accompanying notes 252- 251, infra.
218
See, e.g., TIM HARFORD, THE LOGIC OF LIFE 61 (2008) (discussing self-exclusion policy offered by
Harrah’s casinos); Harrah’s Entertainment, Responsible Gaming, https://www.harrahs.com/harrahscorporate/about-us-responsible-gaming.html.
219
See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 135, at 169 (2010) (noting popularity of a liquidity-constrained bank
account introduced by a rural Mindanao bank in the Philipines); Amanda Swift King & John T. King, Golden
Eggs versus Plastic Eggs: Hyperbolic Preferences and the Persistence of Debit, J. ECON. FIN., Online First (Sept.
24 2009) DOI 10.1007/s12197-009-9107-1, available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/k3230537r4835062/
(observing that consumers may use debit cards as precommitment devices). Soon, credit cards will allow
consumers to set spending limits. See Ron Lieber, Your Card Has Been Declined, Just as You Wanted, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010); MasterCard Worldwide, News Release: Citi to Implement MasterCard inControl (Aug.
17, 2010), http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/newsroom/pr_citi_to_implement_mc_inControl.html); see
also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 124-26 (2008)
(recounting efforts to generate bank interest in such devices); Angela K. Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit
Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 478-80 (2008) (discussing
potential for “self-directed credit cards”).
220
See Laibson, supra note 31.
221
An interesting example of this approach is the choice to purchase smaller packages of a vice good, which
requires giving up volume discounts. See Klaus Wertenbroch, Consumption Self-Control by Rationing Purchase
Quantities of Virtue and Vice, 17 MARKETING SCI. 317 (1998).
222
See, e.g., StickK, http://www.stickk.com (offering “commitment contracts” under which individuals can
choose to stake money that will go to others (including disliked charities) if the commitment is broken); Michael
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With few exceptions, however, such devices are vulnerable to unraveling
through additional private transactions.223 For example, a person might
lock up resources to render them inaccessible until a future date, but their
future availability would then provide a basis upon which some other
private entity would extend credit.224
Tax policy already incorporates some precommitment opportunities.
Consider, for example, the tax treatment of early withdrawals from IRAs or
401(k)s,225 or the withholding system’s accommodation of excessive
advance tax payments.226 But there is room for much more innovation in
the governmental provision of precommitment products.227 Setting up such
mechanisms would entail administrative costs that might be viewed as a
form of in-kind redistribution to low-willpower types.228 However, these
transfers would avoid the identification and incentive problems of other
compensatory schemes. Just as providing assistive devices in kind to
people with disabilities can make those individuals better off without
attracting "mimickers,"229 a precommitment product that is valuable to lowwillpower people but valueless to high-willpower people would make
targeted assistance to the former group self-enforcing.
Precommitment can only reach true self-control problems—where a
person knows the best course of action and wishes to bind herself to take it.
It is no good as a remedy for time preferences that society wishes people
did not have, nor does it help the individual who lacks insight into the best
course of action. Moreover, if the precommiting self is not acting in the
composite interests of the self over time, precommitment can generate error
costs.230 An additional underbreadth problem could result if people do not
B. Abramowicz and Ian Ayres, Compensating Commitments: The Law and Economics of Commitment Bonds That
Compensate for the Possibility of Forfeiture (May 20, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612396.
223
See, e.g., Laibson, supra note 23, at 27 (explaining that private interventions designed to implement
desired savings plans "are vulnerable to third party arbitrage").
224
See, e.g., Laibson, supra note 23, at 27; Laibson supra note 31, at 461 (explaining how instantly available
credit makes illiquid goods like houses less effective as precommitment devices); Gruber & Köszegi, supra note
26, at 1286 (observing that if one company offered a precommitment drug that caused pain whenever the person
taking it smoked, another company would have an incentive to devise an antidote that would stop the pain). Legal
interventions might take the form of limiting unraveling of precommitment devices rather than direct
governmental provision of them. See Laibson, supra note 23, at 27 (noting the potential for outlawing the
arbitrage opportunities that threaten to unravel private precommitments).
225
See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 44, at 1313-14; Chen & Schwartz, supra note 54, at 5.
226
A large majority of U.S. taxpayers engage in overwithholding or make excessive interim tax payments;
similarly, most EITC recipients fail to take advantage of the advance payment option. Although precommitment
is far from the only possible explanation for these behaviors, it may well play a role. For an overview of the
literature on this question, see, e.g., Fennell, supra note 17, at 148-52. I thank Ilan Benshalom for comments on
this point.
227
See, e.g., Chen & Schwartz, supra note 54, at 5 (proposing state provision of “[t]otally illiquid savings
vehicles).
228
See Mitchell, supra note 203, at 172-75.
229
See Weisbach, supra note 47, at 87-89.
230
For example, a projection bias could cause an earlier self to commit to a course of action that would turn
out to be a mistake. Botond Köszegi and Matthew Rabin give the example of a woman who plans to deliver her
child without anesthesia, but then requests anesthetics while in labor. Botond Köszegi & Matthew Rabin,
Revealed Mistakes and Revealed Preferences, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS
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fully appreciate the future self-control problems they will encounter. Here,
the problem is not that people are unaware of their OACPs or how to
achieve them; they simply underestimate the difficulty of exerting
willpower at the crucial moment of decision.231 Hence, they might fail to
engage in precommitment even when it would generate significant gains.
Although this lack of self-awareness might seem like a daunting problem,
there may be ways to surmount it.
One approach would be to make precommitment mandatory without
placing any limits on the content of the choice. David Laibson's "advance
notification game," which would require that "consumers choose their
consumption level one-period before the consumption actually takes place"
represents an interesting elaboration of this idea.232 As long as the deciding
self's interests are aligned with the individual's composite preferences,
mandatory pre-decision approaches could help close the utility gap that selfcontrol problems introduce.233 On the other hand, the requirement to decide
in advance deprives people of the opportunity to adjust their consumption
plans in light of newly learned information.234 While the tradeoff may be
worth it for people with self-control problems,235 it could impose a net cost
on those with high willpower.
Another strategy is to offer choices that operate as precommitments for
sophisticates, but that also attract naifs for independent reasons.236 For
example, O’Donoghue and Rabin explain how an opt-in tax and subsidy
system for making an unhealthy food (potato chips) more expensive and a
healthy food (carrots) less expensive would attract not only sophisticates
who wish to precommit to the repricing scheme, but also health-conscious
193, 206-07 (Andrew Caplin & Andrew Schotter, eds., 2008). This preference reversal could either represent a
failure of willpower or a response to an earlier inability to predict pain levels; if the latter, enforcing the woman’s
initial preference would reduce her well-being. See id.
231
See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 29 (examining effects of naiveté about self-control problems);
O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 19 (analyzing the effects of partial recognition of willpower problems).
232
Laibson, supra note 23, at 21-22. As Laibson explains, the idea would "work like a bank account that
requires advance notification for withdrawals." Id. at 21. In another article, Laibson shows how illiquid goods
such as houses might implement such a game, if turning these goods into currency requires time and effort.
Laibson, supra note 55, at 446-51. Easy availability of credit to borrow against those goods undoes these gains,
however. Id. at 461-67.
233
See Laibson, supra note 23, at 21-22.
234
See Laibson, supra note 55, at 467 (noting that "being able to consume in unforeseen emergencies" might
offset the losses that liquidity imposes on those who would like to commit not to consume). Put a different way,
option value is lost when decisions must be made early.
235
For example, Laibson concludes based on his model that "[a]ll selves would be willing to pay 9/10 of one
year's income ... to induce the government to implement one of the proposed savings schemes." Laibson, supra
note 23, at 30.
236
See O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10 (tax and subsidy schemes that encourage the consumption of
healthy food); Chen & Schwartz, supra note 54 (illiquid savings instruments that attract sophisticates for the
precommitment and naifs for the higher interest rate). Another intriguing approach would actually leverage the
time biases of naifs to encourage precommitment. Recent work has argued, for example, that allowing people to
auction off the right to receive a set amount of money if they fail to meet self-set goals could attract hyperbolic
discounters by making a lump of cash available upfront for taking on the challenge. See AYRES, supra note 135,
at 60; Abramowicz & Ayres, supra note 222, at 13-15.
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but willpower-challenged naifs.237 The naifs assume they will want to eat
only carrots in the future and elect the scheme simply because it makes their
preferred consumption cheaper, yet when temptation arises, the scheme
assists them in sticking to their plans.238 This line of analysis suggests that
government could take the idea of precommitment a step further by
consciously devising menu options for individuals to select among.
B. Self-Sorting Into Different Tax Regimes
The idea of allowing people to elect into different tax or regulatory
regimes is not new. For example, the tax code already allows married
people to choose between filing jointly and separately, and permits certain
forms of self-classification for business entities.239 A number of tax
provisions implicitly or explicitly allow taxpayers to choose when tax
payments will be made, and the potential for further choice along these lines
has been noted.240
Self-selection has also received recent theoretical
attention as a way of improving the targeting of a variety of social
policies,241 including those specifically addressing self-control issues.242
Rather than have policymakers categorize people based on some observable
characteristic, as in Akerlofian tagging,243 people effectively tag
themselves. Such self-sorting can harness private information and partition
237

O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 189-90.
Id. Note that the election between tax regimes in this context is just a weaker form of requiring advance
notification of consumption. In effect, one chooses a consumption plan that one can later escape by paying a
higher price. O’Donoghue & Rabin also discuss a more explicit version of this preplanning notion—
nonrefundable coupons for purchasing certain goods. Id. at 190.
239
See, e.g., Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schedule Selection by Agents: From Price Plans to
(February 2008),
available at
Tax Tables, NBER Working Paper
No. 13808
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13808, at 2; Heather M. Field, Choosing Tax: Explicit Elections as an Element of
Design in the Federal Income Tax System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21 (2010).
240
For example, taxpayers can prepay (or overpay) taxes through the withholding and estimated tax systems,
can choose between a currently taxable Roth IRA and a tax-deferred traditional IRA, and can decide when to sell
assets and realize a gain or loss. Other mechanisms for accelerating or deferring tax payments at the taxpayer’s
election have also been contemplated. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 249 (discussing a plan in which
households could choose to defer a portion of their tax payments); Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes, and
Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 649-52 (2003) (discussing estate tax prepayment); Jerry Gleeson, Congress Mulls
REGISTERED
REP.,
May
14,
2010,
available
at
“Prepaid”
Estate
Tax,
http://registeredrep.com/wealthmanagement/estateplan/congress_mulls_prepaid_estate_tax_0514/.
241
See Luttmer & Zeckhauser, supra note 239, at 17-25 (modeling and estimating the gains that might be
achievable with income tax schedule selection); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to
Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009) (suggesting that tax enforcement could be targeted
more effectively by offering taxpayers a choice between two enforcement regimes that would be differentially
attractive to differently motivated taxpayers); Weisbach, supra note 47, at 93-99 (discussing use of differentially
attractive packages to redistribute toward people with disabilities).
242
Susanna Estaban, & Eiichi Miyagawa, Optimal Menu of Menus with Self-Control Preferences, Columbia
University Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 0405-11 (December 2004), available at
http://digitalcommons.libraries.columbia.edu/econ.dp/54 (modeling how sellers might gain from offering
consumers multiple menus to select among, where some consumers have self-control problems and would prefer a
menu with fewer choices); O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 189-90 (discussing the potential for sorting
into "type-specific optimal tax schemes").
243
George A. Akerlof, The Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare
Programs, and Manpower Planning, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 8 (1978).
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the population in ways that facilitate tailored treatment of the subgroups.
Willpower offers a paradigm case in which self-selection is feasible. By
definition, willpower deficits involve a level of self-awareness about the
best available plan coupled with an incapacity to carry it out. People in this
position will uniquely value policy instruments that can bring outcomes into
line with their preferences.
For such self-sorting to generate benefits, however, it is necessary that
the alternatives not only be differentially attractive to groups of people who
vary along a dimension relevant to policy, but also capable of delivering
better-tailored policy treatments to each of those groups. Thus, as Alex
Raskolnikov has explained in another tax context, the alternatives must be
designed to accomplish two goals: effectively separating the population
into groups for purposes of differential treatment ("separating") and actually
applying appropriately different treatment to the groups ("targeting").244
Not every feature of the respective bundles needs to serve both
objectives.245 For example, some aspects of a given package might be
included to repel people with particular characteristics without delivering
any special benefits to those who are not repelled.246 Similarly, a feature
that would be attractive to both groups can be included in one of the
bundles, as long as it is mixed with enough other differentially attractive
elements that sort the population. Nonetheless, both goals must be kept in
mind in composing the alternatives.247
Could we devise alternative tax and regulatory packages that would
harness private information about willpower levels and thus split the
taxpaying population along willpower lines? The sections below explore
this question.
1.

Selecting Sin Taxes

The simplest version of a self-sorting idea would just involve making
precommitment products available to those who want them. If retaining the
option value of changing one’s mind later is more valuable to those with
high willpower, then the net benefit of such a device would be greater for
those with self-control problems. Here, the good provided in kind operates
both as a screening mechanism and as a benefit bestowed selectively on the
screened group. Alternatively, people might be required to select between
different tax schedules, with the choice serving as a kind of precommitment.
244

Raskolnikov, supra note 241, at 739-40 (distinguishing “separating” from “targeting”).
See id.
246
See, e.g., Estaban & Miyagawa, supra note 242, at 3 (explaining that sellers might "decorate" one menu
with tempting items that would be irrelevant for one consumer group but aversive to another group with particular
self-control problems).
247
See Raskolnikov, supra note 241, at 740 n. 206 (counseling caution in adding features that pursue one
goal at the expense of the other).
245
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Many variations on tax and subsidy schemes might be devised to
operationalize this idea.
For example, Jay Bhattacharya and Darius Lakdawalla have suggested
that smokers could voluntarily purchase “smoking licenses” that would
commit their future selves to cigarette taxes.248 More elaborate regulatory
choices might also be offered. Consider, for example, another O'Donoghue
and Rabin idea: in order to purchase cigarettes, people would be required to
obtain a special photo ID that would cost $5,000 and would entitle its bearer
to 2,500 tax-free packages of cigarettes.249 Only those who planned to
smoke a great deal would get their money's worth out of the license, and
hence it would be expected to attract those who had rationally decided to
pursue a cigarette addiction,250 but not those who planned to smoke only a
little and then quit. If we assume that many of those in the latter category
would experience unforeseen willpower problems that would cause them to
experience utility-diminishing addictions, then the expensive license would
provide a valuable deterrent without getting in the way of any rationally
planned addiction.251
Variations on this basic approach could permit low-willpower people to
remove options from their own choice sets, force better intertemporal
decisions, or penalize (reward) themselves for making bad (good) choices
over time. One wrinkle that the discussion above already hinted at is this:
making the program more attractive to people who do not recognize their
own self-control problems (thus addressing the problem of underinclusion)
may reduce the ability of the program to target only those with low
willpower (creating a problem of overinclusion). To return to O’Donoghue
and Rabin’s dietary tax and subsidy scheme, we would expect high
willpower people who happen to prefer carrots to potato chips to opt into
the regime, just as we would expect low-willpower naifs with those
preferences to do so.252 This overinclusion will not present a problem if the
only benefit we are seeking to provide is in-kind precommitment
opportunities (e.g., for healthier eating), but it could complicate efforts to
target additional benefits to those (and only those) with low willpower.253
2.

Choosing Patterns of Intrapersonal Redistribution

248
Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra note 59; see also Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1399, 1482-85 (presenting a variation on this theme that would allow smokers to choose their own tax level
and create options for their later selves to exercise).
249
O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 190. See also id. (noting that "[i]f there were concerns that this
scheme would prevent optimal experimentation, we could also issue a one-time 'learner's permit' allowing a
person to purchase up to 10 packs of cigarettes").
250
See Becker & Murphy, supra note 26.
251
See O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10.
252
O'Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 10, at 186, 189-90.
253
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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The intrapersonal redistribution that is built into the present annual
taxation system is likely to be more attractive to those who are less able to
rearrange money within the life cycle, while those who are good at
spreading their consumption optimally would prefer lifetime averaging.254
As a first cut, we might imagine policymakers allowing taxpayers to present
themselves either as separate annual temporal entities with respect to tax
burdens and distributive considerations, or as fully integrated lifetime
entities for whom burdens and benefits should be calculated on a life-cycle
basis. Yet neither characterization is likely to be systematically accurate for
either of our populations of interest. High-willpower people who lack
liquidity would be extremely interested in intrapersonal redistribution that
moves money earlier in the life cycle, but quite disinterested in
intrapersonal redistribution that moves money later in the life cycle.
Conversely, low-willpower people (in their composite reflective states)
would not want any redistribution that expands their early-life consumption
opportunities beyond their OACP. However, they would be quite interested
in redistribution to those spots in the life cycle that they would, left to their
own devices, have a tendency to leave depleted.
Although hyperopic low-willpower people present a complication, we
might generalize and say that forward (later in time) intrapersonal
redistribution will typically be more attractive to those who know they have
low willpower and wish to precommit, while backwards (earlier in time)
intrapersonal redistribution will be more attractive to those with high
willpower. Because it is possible to use tools like age-specific taxation or
flexible tax payment options to increase or decrease the amount of
intrapersonal redistribution that occurs in either direction, people might be
given a choice about how to allocate their tax burden (and benefit
payments) over the life cycle.255 There are, of course, many nonwillpowerrelated considerations that would cabin the degree to which this approach
could be implemented. For example, we would not want to allow even the
highest willpower individual to take all of her expected Social Security
benefits in early adulthood, given both the moral hazard concerns regarding
future taxpaying and the externalities associated with unalleviated poverty
late in life. Nonetheless, offering some degree of choice about the extent
and direction of the flow could prove useful for both high-willpower and
low-willpower individuals.

254

This preference is sensitive to the collection method in place. See Liebman, supra note 4, at 31-50
(analyzing the impact of averaging on taxpayers with different earning patterns); see also Shaviro supra note 3, at
762-63 (discussing Vickrey's criterion regarding the relationship between the tax due in a given period and the
income in the prior period under lifetime averaging and noting its "poor intellectual fit" with the system's
assumption that taxes should not be sensitive to earning patterns).
255
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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Targeting Low Willpower with Tax Menus

The alternatives discussed thus far roll together the functions of
separation and targeting—the targeted treatment applied to the separated
groups is the very thing that makes the separation effective.256 Suppose,
however, that we wished to further address the utility gap between highwillpower and low-willpower people through a compensatory tax
strategy.257 Redistribution from low-willpower people to high-willpower
people cannot proceed on such a self-separating basis; because everyone
likes receiving redistributive payments, redistribution (the targeted
treatment) cannot itself serve as a separating mechanism. If we wanted to
include such redistribution, we would need to devise packages that are
capable of performing the separating work in a manner robust enough to
withstand the introduction of a universally valued element into one of the
packages. In other words, we have to insert something into the lowwillpower bundle that is more aversive to high-willpower people than the
added money is attractive, without making it so aversive as to drive off lowwillpower individuals.
To fix ideas, consider the following two tax packages, which offer an
example of how such an approach might work.
Table 3: Two Packages
Intrapersonal
Redistribution
Other Provisions
Tax Rates

Package One
Skews Earlier

Package Two
Skews Later

Flexible Tax Payment Customized Borrowing
Terms
and Spending
Restrictions
Higher
Lower

Each of these packages would begin with a progressive wage tax that
bases ultimate tax burdens on an entire lifetime of earnings. However, tax
collections and the payment of benefits would be arranged so as to
consciously carry out a fair measure of intrapersonal redistribution. This
256

See text accompanying notes 244-247, supra.
What follows is an analytic investigation into this possibility, not a normative endorsement of such a
compensatory approach. Before rejecting this form of redistribution, however, the implicit redistributive effects
of alternative approaches should be examined. See Mitchell, supra note 203, at 1269-75 (critiquing the
redistributive element embedded in libertarian paternalism). Even seemingly neutral policies, such as those that
withdraw choices across the board, have the effect of burdening higher-willpower people in order to benefit
lower-willpower people. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
257

29-Oct-10]

WILLPOWER TAXES

51

redistributive element would be timed differently under the two packages,
however. In Package One, intrapersonal redistribution would operate
primarily to move money to earlier points in the life cycle. This feature
would be especially attractive for liquidity constrained people who have a
high degree of willpower, because it would relax an outside constraint that
impedes optimization. Because Package Two would skew intrapersonal
redistribution in the opposite direction, it would be expected to attract
lower-willpower people who desire assistance in moving money later in the
life cycle.
In addition, each package offers some additional provisions that we
might expect high- and low-willpower people to find differentially
attractive. Package One taxpayers are granted flexible tax repayment terms
that permit them to shift payment for some of their lifetime tax burden into
their later years, which would further help to relieve liquidity constraints. 258
Package Two taxpayers might also find the flexibility attractive in theory,
but their self-control problems would make deferring a tax burden
dangerous for them. Instead, Package Two taxpayers are subject to
customized borrowing and spending restrictions,259 as well as carefully
scheduled tax payments. The restrictions should be attractive to lowwillpower individuals as a form of precommitment that helps to advance
their OACPs, but high-willpower individuals will likely view the limits as
aversive intrusions, given their ability to achieve their OACPs on their own.
If the features contained in the first two rows in Table 3 were effective
enough in separating the two populations, it might be possible to add some
modest measure of redistribution to the treatment mix, as indicated in the
third row. The extent to which this would be possible is an open question.
Obviously, a primary concern with a "choose your tax regime" plan is that
people will attempt to obtain more favorable treatment than the plan's
design intends to give them. Thus, it is possible that some people without
self-control problems would accept Package Two's (for them) aversive and
unnecessary restrictions on borrowing and consumption in order to get the
lower tax rate. Not only would this produce redistribution in the wrong
direction, it would also involve deadweight loss (the unwanted
restrictions).260 The opposite classification problem could also result: those
258

See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 249.
While it would be possible to permit taxpayers some degree of choice as to how these limits would work,
and customization to account for health, wealth, family, and lifestage factors could be readily incorporated, it is
probably unrealistic to suppose that taxpayers could enlist the government’s help in following any consumption
pattern they happen to prefer. A particular concern is whether the program could offer any help to the hyperopic
oversaver. It would be theoretically possible to let such a person precommit to a "sensible" spending plan that
capped the amount of savings as well as the amount of spending in each period, but it is unclear whether support
for such an approach would exist. Despite some excellent theoretical work on the topic, concerns about hyperopia
have received very little attention in the policy realm.
260
On the other hand, the low tax rate might attract some people who lack knowledge of their own selfcontrol problems and thereby provide the benefits of precommitment to those who would otherwise not seek them
259
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who are naive about their severe self-control problems might elect Package
One in order to avoid restrictions on their borrowing and consumption and
end up much worse off—more heavily taxed and yet unable to actually
move money optimally within the life cycle. Both possibilities raise the
question of whether some limits could or should be placed on the choice of
plan.
There are a variety of possibilities in this regard. The softest approach
would be simply to have a different default package apply depending on
wealth or savings levels (relative to others in one's income band and life
cycle stage) and allow people to opt out if they chose. Other alternatives
would make information about wealth accumulation give rise to
presumptions of varying strengths about the appropriate classification; those
presumptions might be rebutted with sufficient evidence of saving and
spending patterns. But such a presumption-based approach undercuts the
notion of self-selection, imposes new informational and administrative
burdens, and would quickly become unacceptably intrusive.
Another alternative would be to incorporate information about wealth
explicitly into Package Two's design, so that the tax advantages (but not the
other features) would be phased out as accumulated wealth increases. For
example, when a certain threshold of wealth is reached (which would vary
based on age),261 the tax schedules for the two packages would become
identical. However, people opting for Package Two would still be able to
receive the in-kind benefits of borrowing and spending restrictions and
forward-skewed intrapersonal redistribution. In effect, this approach would
involve “tagging” people who opt for Package Two depending on their
wealth accumulation levels262 and then customizing the treatment that they
receive based on that information. Wealth might seem like an unpromising
basis for tagging, given that it is mutable. But complete immutability is not
required for tagging to produce gains,263 and, as discussed below, some of
the program details contemplated here would make strategizing difficult. It
is also perhaps notable that wealth is already used as a tag of sorts when
asset thresholds are employed as criteria for certain social welfare
programs.264
out. See text accompanying notes 236-237.
261
There is evidence that self-control problems fall with age, see Ameriks et al., supra note 23, but wealth
accumulations at older ages would continue to reflect the impacts of willpower exercised at earlier ages. The idea
that capital taxation might be varied by age is raised in James Banks & Peter A. Diamond, The Base for Direct
Taxation, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 08-11 (2008) at 59, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112821.
262
See Akerlof, supra note 243.
263
See id. at 15-16 (discussing and modeling cases of endogenous group membership—situations where
"people, by some effort or with some loss of utility, may alter their characteristics, thereby becoming members of
a tagged group"); see also Kyle D. Logue & Joel B. Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely
Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 843, 849 (2008).
264
See, e.g., Robin Boadway et al., Agency and the Design of Welfare Systems, 73 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (1999)
(listing "asset wealth" among the "personal characteristics" used to determine eligibility, and connecting the
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The rationale for building in information about wealth could rest in part
on an assumed correlation between wealth levels and willpower levels,
holding income and life stage constant.265 But we might also think that
willpower lapses are more damaging for those with less available wealth as
a buffer. Thus, even if a person's asset classification offers only a weak
signal of willpower, that information may still provide a sensible basis for
withdrawing the benefits of a lighter tax schedule—the only piece of
Package Two's treatment that operates at cross-purposes with the packages'
separation function.266
Of course, introducing a wealth criterion presents a new worry: that
high- and low-willpower people alike might shun savings in order to qualify
for lower tax rates under that plan. Introducing thresholds or breakpoints
between net worth classes presents additional concerns—that people will
have a strong incentive to alter their wealth accumulation behavior to stay
in the more lightly taxed group, and that people who differ only slightly in
their holdings but lie on opposite sides of the dividing line will be unfairly
and arbitrarily subjected to different tax treatment. These latter concerns
could be ameliorated somewhat by adding a "phase out" range to soften the
cliff effect, as well as by resetting the breakpoints regularly based on
criteria that are undisclosed in advance and produced through some element
of randomization.267
The broader concern that people will shun savings could be addressed in
some measure by the binding limits on borrowing and spending that come
with Package Two. Given those limits, people choosing Package Two
cannot consistently enjoy high earnings without also accumulating wealth
that, over time, will move them into higher asset brackets. Choosing
Package Two, then, means voluntarily ceding a large measure of control
over the means through which one might ordinarily attempt to game the
system. Of course, people would continue to have control over their
earnings, and they could certainly reduce their wealth indirectly (and thus
qualify for lower rates) by reducing their earnings. But this is nothing more
than an observation that a tax on labor earnings may disincentivize labor,
and the same would be true of any tax on labor earnings even if wealth were
not made part of the picture.
eligibility determination process to Akerlof's idea of "tagging"); David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The
Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 999-1000, 1008-10 (2004) (discussing asset
limits in the food stamp program).
265
See supra notes 172-173 and accompanying text.
266
See text accompanying notes 244-247, supra on targeting v. separating.
267
Cf. Jonathan Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809, 815-28 (2009) (advocating “retrospective allocation” mechanisms that introduce
uncertainty into grandfathering schemes in an effort to reduce strategic behavior). For further analysis of how the
use of categorical information (tagging) might be combined with income where there is heterogeneity among
those within categories, see Ritva Immonen et al., Tagging and Taxing: The Optimal Use of Categorical and
Income Information in Designing Tax/Transfer Schemes 65 ECONOMICA, n.s., 179 (1998).
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The overall program could be designed to build in some additional
protections against strategic behavior. For example, we might tinker with
the revocability of the choice among packages. If the choice were made
irrevocable (for a time) or if changes required incurring costs, then a highwillpower person might not find it worthwhile to sneak into the Package
Two ranks even if her wealth level is presently low enough to deliver her a
tax break; as her wealth accumulates, she will eventually end up paying tax
rates that are just as high as under Package One, but will still be stuck with
the annoying borrowing and spending limits and intrapersonal redistribution
that runs in the wrong direction. It is still possible that a high-willpower
person would gain enough in tax breaks during low earning years to make
this gambit worthwhile, but the extra liquidity that she can get through
Package One's flexible tax repayment terms may prove even more
attractive. It would be unworkable to lock people into their package choice
for all time, but shorter limits and penalties for shifting could keep people
from finding it profitable to opportunistically "package surf."
Would all this design effort be worthwhile? The answer is far from
clear. Enabling both high-willpower and low-willpower people to better
approximate their OACPs seems quite attractive, as does the potential to
reduce “exercise costs” and “failure costs” simultaneously. It is also
possible that treating willpower more selectively and surgically could
forestall more socially costly initiatives that would block certain
consumption choices for high-willpower types as well as low-willpower
types. But there are many other considerations that would bear on the
feasibility and desirability of such an alternative, including administrative
costs268 and concerns about unwarranted governmental leverage over
personal decisions.269 Moreover, there could be unwanted effects on the
inculcation of willpower and related values throughout society (“erosion
costs”), if we let people opt out of controlling important aspects of their
own consumption paths. The interaction of this approach with other
measures designed to address externalities would also require attention.
My point in sketching this example is not to advocate it, nor even to
provide a comprehensive review of its merits, but rather to provide a
268
See Field, supra note 239, at 22-30 (discussing the added burdens of complexity and administration that
may be associated with tax provisions that allow for explicit elections).
269
For example, we might worry that low income people would feel pressured by lower tax rates into letting
the government take over their personal financial choices. The extension of flexible repayment terms and early
life-cycle liquidity to the Package One taxpayers would help to counter that concern. In addition, both of the tax
schedules would presumably have a zero bracket and would interact with existing programs like Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in ways that would keep low
income people from being forced into a desperate bargain with the government. But this merely shifts our
concern up the income scale: perhaps middle class people would find Package Two's lower rates irresistible.
There is, in fact, no way to structure an incentive without having it attract some people who would not otherwise
choose that alternative. Hence, we must ultimately decide whether greater governmental control over personal
saving and spending decisions seems legitimate.
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starting point for thinking about how willpower differences might be
addressed through policy. Governmental decisions already implicate
willpower, as we have seen, and it is entirely possible that additional
interventions will be in the offing. In considering these alternatives, we
would do well to consider whether and how the potential for self-selection
could deliver benefits at lower cost. Indeed, one potential take-away lesson
is the difficulty in engineering strategy-proof mechanisms for moving
money between people of different willpower levels and the comparatively
greater traction that intrapersonal transfers and tools might provide.
CONCLUSION
Tax policy grapples with numerous dimensions of human
heterogeneity.270 This paper has intentionally focused on just one narrow
slice—variations in willpower. My analysis has necessarily filtered out
much that is important and relevant to devising tax policy. But I hope to
have added an accessible account of how and why willpower heterogeneity
matters to tax policy, a framework for evaluating policy efforts, and some
ideas about how self-selection might be employed to advance the treatment
of willpower heterogeneity. As modeling and empirical work continues on
cognitive features, including willpower, it will become increasingly
important to understand how these lessons map onto real and proposed tax
systems. Mechanisms that can induce populations to self-sort into groups
that share cognitive traits can make for less intrusive and more tailored
social policy. I hope that the ideas presented here will lead to further work
along these lines.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Lee Fennell
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
lfennell@uchicago.edu
270

For a recent examination of some of the complexities that heterogeneity introduces, see Louis Kaplow,
Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 617 (July
2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1170048.
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